









TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND EMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH 
AFRICAN AGRICULTURE : THE CASE OF MAIZE 
HARVESTING IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL, 
1968-1981 
MICHAEL JOHN DE KLERK 
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree 
Master of Arts in Economics, 
at the 











The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 













Changes in the choice of technique in the harvesting 1and 
delivery of maize and weeding, the causes of these changes, 
and their consequences for employment and unemployment, 
were investigated. Data was collected for 61 farms in 
six magisterial districts of the Western Transvaal for the 
period 1968-1981. In 1968 about 30 percent of the crop 
was being harvested mechanically; by 1981 95 percent. 
Sacks, in which almost half of total output was being 
delivered to depots in 1968, had, by 1977, been almost 
completely displaced by bulk handling. From 15 percent of 
the total crop area if 1968, weed sprays were being applied 
to 95 percent in 1981. There was an increase of about 
75 percent in the average surface area,of farms, and more 
than a doubling in the average yield per hectare. The 
greatest part of most of these changes occurred between 
1973 and 1977. The causes of changes in the choice of 
technique were sought both in theory - neo-classical and 
historical-m~terialist - and in empirical evidence. A 
growing shortage of men but not of women, the convenience 
and controllability of combine-harvesting, and economies 
of scale generated by the increasing size of farms, were 
all important causes. But the cost advantage of mechanical-
over hand-harvesting on all except the smallest farms is 
what appears to have been crucial. For various reasons, 
this was not fully exploited until the middle '70s. 
Exogenous developments in technology, rather than changes 
in relative factor prices, should be seen as the fundamen-
tal cause of changes in harvesting techniques. Seasonal 
workers were still employed to glean after combine-harvesting 
and to hoe spray-resistant weeds, but whereas in the late 
'60s seasonal harvesting teams consisted typically of a 
comparatively large number of workers from black rural 
areas, mainly adults - women in the majority - and a few 
children, by the late '70s they were composed of a 
comparatively small number, most of whom were the wives 
and children of permanent farm workers, living on white 
farms. Between 1968 and 1981, the number of seasonal 
ii 
jobs per 1 000 hectares of maize fell by about 70 percent 
in harvesting and delivery, and by 60 percent in weeding. 
Rough estimates show total seasonal employment to have 
fallen from about 105 000 to 43 000 annually, the mechani-
zation of reaping being the most important single cause. 
The employment of permanent workers in harvesting and 
delivery declined by almost 50 percent per 1 000 hectares, 
enabling the total number of workers to contract from about 
30 000 in 1969 to 25 000 in 1976. Since 1977 employment 
patterns have stabilized. Though few men appear to have 
become unemployed because of changes in technology, women 
from black rural areas, chiefly in Bophuthatswana, have 
generally not been able to find other jobs. The real 
wages of permanent workers rose by 150 percent between 
1970 and 1981, while those of seasonaJ workers increased 
only marginally. Changes in both wage and employment 
patterns have greatly narrowed the distribution of agricul-
tural income. 
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ON THE SUBJECT AND ITS CHOICE 
1.1 UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
This thesis investigates three issues: 
1. the changes in the choice of maize harvesting, 
delivery and weeding techniques that occurred on 
farms in the Western Transvaal between 1968 and 
1981; 
2. the causes of these changes; 
3. their consequences for employment and unemployment. 
The greater part of the analysis is about .the effect of 
technological change on employment patterns, but the ulti-
mate concern is not so much with employment as with unem-
ployment. So the essential question is: has technological 
change in South African agriculture led to unemployment? 
The means of attempting an answer is a micro-study with a 
highly specific focus. 
If one had to choose a single feature by which to charac-
terize each decade, for South Africa in the 1960s it would 
probably be 'boom', and for the 1970s - or at least for 
1 
their second half - 'unemployment'. Most people would agree 
that jobs during the latter part of the '70s were hard to 
1 come by. 
For the majority of middle class South Africans, knowledge 
of this came through the news media; but for most working 
class people no such secondhand source was needed. Especi-
ally if one was black, and one's family was resident in a black 
rural area, the problem of finding work could never have been 
greater. Quite apart from legal restrictions, competition 
for urban jobs was intense, and - what was new - even the 
traditional jobs on white-owned farms could no longer be 
relied on if nothing else turned up. 2 
Because the recession was not confined to South Africa, it 
is easy, in seeking the causes of high unemployment, to go 
no further than contemporary international economic circum-
stances. Certainly these were important, and may even 
have been the dominant factor in the 70s, though this is 
3 not generally agreed upon. But it would be wrong to stop 
the search at that point: other developments of a more 
local but less visible nature may also have played a part. 
The structure of the entire South African 'labour market' 
needs to be studied for changes that either increased the 
supply of workers or reduced the demand for them. On the 
2 
supply side, for example, the State's population relocation 
programme may have increased the number of wage work-seekers. 4 
Studies which will clarify this are in progress. 5 On the 
demand side, changes of technology may'have reduced the 
demand for labour. 
In South Africa a debate on the relationship between techno-
logical change and unemployment began in the late 70s and 
is still in progress. 6 But, partly because data is scarce, 
few contributions to date have attempted to go beyond 
theoretical exposition into the realm of empirical veri-
fication. The object of this research is- in a small way -
to. start to fill this gap. 
As has been explained, the research focuses on the highly 
specific operations of harvesting and delivering maize and 
weeding on farms in the Western Transvaal between the years 
1968 and 1981. 
But why a micro-study? Why agriculture? Why maize 
farming? Why harvesting, delivery and weeding? 
Western Transvaal? And why 1968 to 1981? 
Why the 
1.2 WHY A MICRO-STUDY? 
By nature, most empirical studies necessitate micro-studies. 
Detailed information on the operations and workers affected 
by technological change, and the nature, causes and effects 
of this change, is seldom available from secondary sources. 
So primary data needs to be collected. Limitations on 
time and resources then generally restrict the study to a 
micro-level. 
There are also reasons why one might prefer a micro approach 
to the study of technological change in agriculture: first, 
at a micro level, it is sometimes possible to avoid the 
difficulties of defining and measuring 'capital' in its 
abstract form,that are inherent in macro-studies. 7 
Second, in South African agriculture, macro employment 
statistics are often unreliable because of the extensive 
' employment of seasonal workers. Several writers have 
commented on this. 8 By asking about the number and duration 
of employment of seasonal workers, a micro-study can over-
come this difficulty. 
Third, there is the problem of deducing from changes in the 
capital:output, labour:output and capital:labour ratios, 
whether new techniques have been introduced. For example, 
it is not always easy to distinguish between capital widening, 
in which the same technique is used, and capital deepening, 
which implies the adoption of new techniques. 9 It may 
also be difficult to detect the difference between various 
forms of technical change that do not involve the use of 
additional labour-saving capital equipment. 10 Detailed 
information about techniques and the employment associated 
with them can be gathered in micro-studies. 
Of course, small-scale investigations have problems of their 
own. The field-work necessary to collect primary data, 
though usually rewarding, is also time-consuming and expen-
sive. And, critically, the conclusions apply strictly only 
to the operations techniques, area and period studied, 
3 
though it may be possible to make inferences about related 
activities. This study was designed with the intention 
of making the applicability of its conclusions as wide as 
possible. 
Ultimately one's method depends most on what one is looking 
for. If unemployment is to be understood as more than 
just a faceless statistic, then one needs to know at least 
who the unemployed are, and how they came to be unemployed. 
Information of this nature can only be collected by micro-
studies. 
1.3 WHY AGRICULTURE? 
One of the papers presented at a conference on farm labour 
in South Africa in 1976 was entitled "Agriculture: The 
11 Nation's Largest Employer". Just because farming pro-. 
vides such a large proportion of total employment, it is 
4 
important to examine the incidence and impact of technological 
change in this sector. 
Ironically, almost as the paper was being presented, its 
title became outdated. In the middle 70s, a milestone 
was passed when manufacturing replaced agriculture as the 
largest provider of jobs. 12 But this was perhaps to be 
expected: the decline in the relative level of employment 
in agriculture has been a feature of economic development 
. . d . 1' . . 13 1n most 1n ustr1a 1s1ng countr1es. 
Arguably, a milestone of still greater significance was 
passed at the beginning of the 70s when the decline in the 
absolute number of jobs in agriculture became unambiguous. 14 
No less important are the demographic implications. In 
the United States, as recently as 1950, there were 23 million 
people living on farms, and 9,9 million farm workers. By 
1980, the corresponding numbers were 6 million and 3,7 
million, falls of about 75 and 65 percent respectively. 15 
The magnitude of this demographic change prompted the 
sugges't.ion 't.'na't. "agricul. 't.ure may 'oe the realm where the 
mechanisation of human work has so far had the greatest 
16 effect". 
Does the downturn in the total number of farm jobs neces-
sarily mean that capitalist agriculture in South Africa 
has now entered the same phase that it did in the United 
17 States somes decades ago? Most indications are that 
it does. Mechanisation has long been on the increase on 
South African farms: statistics of the numbers of machines 
and implements bear witness to this. 18 Yet, not until the 
1970s was the net impact of this increase to reduce the 
absolute level of farm employment. 
several reasons for this. 
One can identify 
Mechanisation makes it possible either to produce the same 
output with fewer workers or to produce a•greater output 
with the same number of workers. Until the 1970s it 
~eems, on balance, to have done the latter. Both the more 
5 
intensive use of land and the use of more land-saving capital 
inputs help to explain this: though the total surface 
area of farms changed little, the proportion under culti-
vation increased steadily, roughly doubling between 1930 
and 1970, 19 while the input of fertilizer and other inter-
mediate capital goods, many of which are land-saving, rose 
continuously until the mid-1970s. 20 The levelling out 
of these trends during the past decade has certainly con-
tributed to the fall in employment. 
There is evidence of a continuation of mechanisation during 
the 1970s, but it is not without its ambiguities. On the 
one hand, the Economic Development Programme (1978-87) 
refers to an average annual increase in the capital:labour 
ratio in agriculture of no less than 5,9 percent between 
1969 and 1977, as against 2,8 percent for the preceding 
21 six years. The compilers concluded that mechanisation 
did not merely continue in the 70s but accelerated. The 
Parliamentary Working Committee on the Economic Position 




Nattrass points to the simultaneous fall in the labour: 
output ratio and rise in the capital:output ratio, in the 
early 70s - the first time this had occurred - which, as 
sheargues, is an indication of capital-deepening rather 
than capital-widening. 23 And the numbers of all major 
categories of motorized equipment on farms increased steadily 
24 at least until the late 70s, except for motor cars. All 
these suggest a continued build up of machinery through the 
'70s. 
So it comes as a surprise to find that the gross value of 
machinery, implements, motor vehicles and tractors, measured 
at constant 1975 prices, after rising slowly between 1960 
and 1971, started to decline in 1972 and continued gradually 
downwards until 1979. 25 Even measuring this on a per 
permanent worker basis makes little difference, merely 
26 delaying the peak by two years. The explanation is not 
obvious, particularly in view of the tendency of most 
machines to increase in size and hence in value, even at 
constant prices. The answer may lie in the method of com-
pilation of the statistics, both of the value of machinery 
and of the price index. 
When all the evidence is taken into account, it seems fairly 
certain that mechanization did, in fact, increase during 
the '70s. Coming at a time when the intensity of land-use 
had stopped increasing, and the growth in the input of land-
saving intermediate goods had begun to slow, mechanization 
must rank as the most important cause of the decline in 
farm employment. 
Intimately connected with mechanization was the fall in the 
number of farming units. 27 Starting in the 1950s, the 
consolidation of farms gradually gathered momentum in the 
1960s, and then more than doubled its pace in the 1970s.
28 
Economies of scale in the use both of machinery and of 
6 
labour accompanied this development, and would probably 
also have been one of its major causes. 
One other factor which may also have played a role in the 
decline of farm employment is what one could call an 
'autonomous increase in labour productivity', attributable 
to higher levels of schooling, better training, improved 
wages and living conditions, greater motivation, etc. 
Clearly, a large part of the function of an empirical study 
should be to ascertain the presenpe or absence of each of 
the above factors and to gauge their significance in 
changing employment patterns. 
Finally, the sheer paucity of existing information on the 
relationship between technological change and employment 
on farms in South Africa is an additional reason for focusing 
on agriculture. As Bromberger has remarked of this rela-
tionship in a broader context, "there is no doubt that 
the subject deserves to be studied". 29 
1.4 WHY MAIZE FARMING? 
One way to broaden the validity of micro-studies is to 
examine a large rather than a small industry so as to make 
the potential number of parallels greater. It was partly 
with this in mind that maize farming was chosen. 
Several criteria could be used to judge the size of a 
farming sector. For instance, the number of farms, the 
surface area used for the activity, the number of workers, 
or the value of output. From published census data, there 
is no way of identifying farms that produce maize, or whose 
chief source of income is from maize, so the number of 
farms and the number of workers cannot readily be established. 
Surface area is less than ideal as a means of comparison 
because some activities, such as pastoral farming, are 
more land extensive relative to output and employment than 
others, such as arable farming. However, between field 
7 
crops, a comp~rison on this basis would not be unreasonable. 
The surface area planted with maize has for many years been 
30 considerably greater than for any other crop. 
Perhaps the most satisfactory common denominator, with 
the data that is available, is the value of output. On 
this scale, maize production ranks as by far the most 
important farming activity in South Africa. Since 1960, 
except in the drought year 1973, the annual gross value of 
maize has always been larger than that of any other farm 
product. Its total value between 1960 and 1981 was roughly 
1,8 times greater than that of the next most important 
product, cattle and calves slaughtered, and 3,4 times 
31 greater than the next most important field crop, wheat. 
1.5 WHY HARVESTING AND WEEDING? 
' The two seasons of most intense activity in field crop 
farming are always planting and harvesting. In between, 
there is much work to be done, notably weeding, but the 
urgency is never as great. In many parts of the United 
States, by tradition the number of workers or potential 
workers 32 resident on farms was generally large enough to 
cope with the crucial tasks at the beginning and end of the 
agricultural cycle. 
Until the end of the 1930s, tradition 33 changed slowly. 
Then, with the new decade began a new era: Rasmussen 
relates how "World War II was the impetus to the virtually 
1 . . h . . I 34 Th. h 11 d compete trans1t1on to mec an1zat1on' 1s e ca e 
"the second American agricultural revolution ... the change 
35 from animal power to mechanical power". With the tran-
sition came a fundamental change in the traditional employment 
pat tern. 
On farms in the Mississippi Delta, Day identified two 
36 stages of change in the first, tractors reduced the 
number of workers required at planting time. The response 
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of farmers, he says, was to begin to reduce employment on 
a year-round basis, and instead to employ workers only 
when seasonal needs dictated - at harvesting and weeding 
time. Demographically, this meant the shift of a portion 
of the rural population from farms to nearby villages. In 
the second stage the adoption of combine-harvesters made 
the redundancy of many of these village dwellers complete: 
with both threshing 37 and reaping now performed by machines, 
there was no longer a need for most seasonal workers. 
"An important question", Rasmussen observes, "is what 
happened to the displaced farm population. In earlier 
times surplus farm workers supplied much of the manpower 
needed for the industrialization of the economy. (But) 
since the second American agricultural revolution many of 
the displaced farm people have gone to the cities, often 
to an impoverished and bleak situation. 
38 among the rural poor." 
Others are now 
It is important to know how far the same processes have 
occurred in South Africa, or are likely to do so. Day's 
model does not fit exactly: at least in the first stage 
9 
there are some ~otable differences. To start with, tractors 
in this country seem until fairly recently, to have been 
d t . d h d h . 1 39 use more o Wl en t an to eepen t e cap1ta structure. 
The period of most rapid increase in the employment of 
tractors occurred in the 15 years after the Second World 
War: during this time their numbers increased no less than 
six-fold. 40 However, the effect was not to reduce the 
number of permanent workers. If anything, it continued to 
grow, although comparatively slowly. 41 The main reasons 
f h . d 1" 42 h b h or t 1s, as argue ear 1er , seem to ave een t e more 
intensive use of land and the more extensive use of land-
saving capital inputs. The push off farms during this 
period appears to have been confined largely to the off-
spring of workers living on farms, as opposed to the workers 
themselves. 
Wilson has drawn attention to a second difference: "in the 
10 
peculiar political circumstances of South Africa, (those) 
labourers (who were) pushed off the land during this first 
stage did not, as in Mississipi, have the right to settle 
in nearby villages. They were compelled to go 'back to 
the homelands'" 43 , there to enter the migrant labour pool. 
Whether they were subsequently employed seasonally on farms 
would, to a large extent, have depended on whether the 
labour bureau in that part of the 'homeland' was open to 
urban employers, or whether it recruited exclusively for 
44 farmers. 
In fact, the combination of events identified by Day as con-
stituting 'the first stage' of mechanization in the Mississipi, 
namely a simultaneous growth in the number of tractors 
and season workers, and decline in the number of permanent 
workers, never occurred in South Africa. For, despite the 
continued increase in the number of tractors throughout 
45 the '60s , the numbers of seasonal and permanent workers 
did not rise and fall respectively, but remained on a rather 
uneven plateau. 46 Only after 1969 is an unmistakable 
and almost unbroken decline in permanent employment to be 
seen. And, at almost exactly the same moment, seasonal 
47 employment also started to contract. So, although the 
number of tractors increased still further in the 1970s 48 , 
at no point did the three events take place simultaneously. 
Despite these differences, there are indications that by 
the end of the 1960s, the country's largest farming sector, 
maize production, was entering the second phase outlined by 
Day. Prompted partly by tighter conditions in the labour 
market caused by the prolonged economic boom, calls were 
being heard for the mechanization of maize harvesting, some 
showing the labour-displacing potential of combine-
49 harvesters. One such analysis claimed that "farmers 
who used combines saved an average of 70 percent of the 
labour involved in the (maize) harvesting and threshing 
50 process". 
From 1971 on, the number of seasonal workers did indeed start 
51 to fall. What needs to be determined is the extent to 
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which this reflects, on the one hand, the labour-saving pre-
dictions made about combines, and, on the other, the use 
of more capital-intensive techniques for weeding - the 
only other operation for which large numbers of seasonal 
workers were still employed. And, crucially, whether the 
reduction in employment has meant an increase in unemployment. 
1.6 WHY THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL? 
Of the regions defined by the Maize Board as the major 
maize-producing regions of South Africa52 , the Western 
Transvaal, comprising the eleven magisterial districts 
Bloemhof, Christian~ Coligny, Delareyville, Klerksdorp, 
Koster, Lichtenburg, Potchefstroom, Schweizer-Reneke, Venters-
dorp and Wolmaransstad (see Figure 1), is arguably the 
most important. Between the production seasons 1967/68 
and 1979/80, it planted the largest area of maize - on 
average about 26 percent of the total - and reaped the largest 
crop - on average almost 30 percent of the total - each year, 
with few exceptions. 53 In terms of the relative importance 
of maize in each region, the Western Transvaal also ranked 
first: in 1975/76, the eleven districts concerned earned 
roughly 95 percent of their income from maize, a far higher 
percentage than any other region and implying almost 
1 . 1 54 comp ete ma1ze monocu ture. 
One additional consideration influenced the choice of 
region, namely, the availability of secondary data. Since 
the middle '50s, the Division of Agricultural Production 
Economics of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries 
has conducted detailed annual surveys of the costs of maize 
production in three important maize-farming regions, one 
of which is the Western Transvaal. The main findings are 
published55 , and are used to help determine prices paid to 
farmers by the Maize Board56 , but most of the detail remains 
unpublished. The Department kindly offered to make the 
questionnaires and tabulations available. Though little 
of the data appears below, it was crucial in enabling the 
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research to start and in giving it direction. 
1.7 WHY 1968-1981? 
A preliminary analysis of data collected by the Division 
of Agricultural Production Economics, showed that very few 
farmers in the Western Transvaal were making use of combine 
harvesters in 1966. 57 For this reason, it was decided 
to make the starting year for data-collection 196858 , just 
before the downturn in agricultural employment. 
The author's survey was carried out in 1982 shortly before 
the maize harvesting season began. The last year for 
which data was available was therefore 1981. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter describes the way in which two field surveys 
were carried out to collect primary data from farmers and 
workers, and the methods used to analyse the data. 
2.1 THE SURVEY OF FARMERS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL 
2.1.1 The Questionnaire: Objectives and Design 
The most important part of the field research concerned 
the records and opinions of maize farmers in the Western 
Transvaal. Full details of the questionnaire that was 
used to sample them, are given in Appendix A. 
In the first two sections, a series of questions was 
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asked to construct a chronology of the maize-harvesting and 
weeding techniques used by each farmer between 1968 and 1981, 
and to record the employment associated with each tech-
nique. The purpose of collecting this information was to 
generate two sets of cross-sectional time series relating 
respectively to techniques and employment, which could be 
used to measure the degree and rate of change of each. It 
was not the intention to synthesize a production function from these 
series. As Heady and Dillon point out1 , data of this 
nature is generally unsuitable for such a purpose. 
In the third section a further series of questions was 
asked to find out which, of a wide range of potential 
factors, had played a part in farmers' decision to 
mechanize (or not to mechanize) maize harvesting. 2 Farmers 
were then asked to identify the three most important factors 
in their own decision and to place these in order of 
importance. 
2 .1. 2 
2.1.2.1 
The final section concerned the consequences of mechanizing 
(or not mechanizing) maize harvesting, and consisted partly 
of directed response and partly of open-ended questions. 3 
In the two non-statistical, non-factual parts of the 
questionnaire sections 3 and 4 extensive use was 
made of directed response questions, where it might appear 
that a few open-ended questions would have been adequate. 4 
There are two reasons for this: firstly, the replies to 
open-ended questions are often difficult to analyze, and 
secondly, a small number of open-ended questions does not 
usually produce the same depth of information as a fairly 
comprehensive list of directed response questions. Where 
less well-specified issues were involved and the nature of 
the answers was difficult to anticipate, open-ended 
questions were used. 
5 The Sample 
Sampling frame 
The area regarded by the Department of Agriculture as the 
most important maize-producing region of the Western 
Transvaal 6 includes most of 8 of the 11 magisterial 
districts which comprise the Western Transvaal region, as 
defined by the Maize Board (see Figure 1). The 8 
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magisterial districts concerned are: Coligny, Delareyville, 
Klerksdorp, Koster, Lichtenburg, Schweizer-Reneke, 
Ventersdorp and Wolmaransstad. Of these, Lichtenburg is by 
far the most important 7 , folJow ed by Wolmaransstad and 
Delareyville, which produce similar tonnages, and then 
Schweizer-Reneke The remaining four, Coligny, Klerksdorp, 
Koster and Ventersdorp are all smaller producers. 8 
To make the sample as representative as possible, it was 
essential to include the four largest producers. To save 
time and expense, only two of the smaller group were 
included, namely Coligny and Koster. The grounds on which 
these two were chosen were as follows. For reasons that 
will be explained later 9 , farmers were contacted through the 
co-operatives to which they belonged. Very roughly, 
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Lichtenburg, Delareyville and Coligny fall into the area of 
operation of Noord-Westelike Kooperatiewe Landboumaatskappy 
(referred to after this as NWK), Wolmaransstad and Schweizer-
Reneke into Suid-Westelike Transvaalse Landbou Kooperasie's 
area ( SWT), Klerksdorp area ( SWK), while Koster has its 
own co-operative, Koster Kocperatiewe Landboumaatskappy (KK). 
Since it was necessary to contact NWK to organize the 
survey in Lichtenburg and Delareyville, it required no 
additional arranging to include Coligny. The choice to 
approach KK rather than SWK was made arbitrarily. 10 The six 
magisterial districts which formed the sampling frame were 
therefore Coligny, Delareyville, Koster, . Lichtenburg, 
Schweizer-Reneke and Wolmaransstad. 
2.1.2.2 Population 
Within these six districts there can be few farms on which 
11 no maize is produced. The farms most relevant to the . 
research were those on which maize contributed more to 
income than any other crop or animal. These farms, or 
rather farming units, made up the target population. 
The distinction between 'farms' and 'farming units' is 
important. For census purposes, the Department of Statistics 
defines a farming unit as consisting of "one or more 
separate farms or portions of land, whether they are 
contiguous or not, provided they are situated in the same 
magisterial district and are operated as a single unit". 12 
The distinction between magisterial districts is immateria1.13 
But what is important is the operation of one or more 
separate farms or portions of land as a single unit: 
unless the various sections "lie far" apart, the machinery 
used on one part is likely to be used onthe others too. 
So farmers' choice of technique is like to be made with the 
entire farming unit in mind, and it was in respect of this 
. h h . d 14 un1t t at t ey were quest1one . 
The precision of a sample is determined by its stability 
and its representativeness. The former depends on the size 
of the sample, both absolutely and in relation to the 
population, and the latter primarily on the method of 
selection. 
2.1.2.3 Stability 
If it is planned to draw statistically valid inferences 
from a survey, then some form of random sample selection is 
17 
essential. Statistical validity was an important considera-
tion and the initial intention was to select a sample on a 
random basis. In the event, it was not possible to obtain 
a list of the population because the three co-operatives 
were reluctant to make their members' registers available, 
and could not have been expected to release confidential 
information about the percentage of each member's income 
d . d f . 15 er1ve rom ma1ze. 
lt did not seem reasonable to ask the co-operatives to 
identify farmers who qualified in term& of locality and 
source of income, and then to select them on a statistically 
random basis. 
be accepted. 
So some form of non-random sample had to 
One result was that no minimum sample 
size could be specified that would enable sampling errors 
to be estimated within pre-determined confidence limits. 
The best that could be done was to make the sample size as 
large as possible, given the constraints of time and expense. 
Prior to the introduction of random sampling techniques in 
1976, the Department of Agriculture visited about 100 
farmers each year during its cost surveys. 16 After 1976, 
this fell to about 90. 17 In the six weeks allocated to 
the author's survey, it proved impossible to interview 
this number of farmers. The length of the questionnaire 
and practical problems, such as travelling between farms, 
waiting, and not interfering with meal-times, reduced the 
average number of interviews per day to two. 
the six weeks, 61 farms had been visited. 18 
At the end of 
Table 1 shows the number of farms of the 61 visited which 
were being operated by their present owners in each of 
,, 
these four years. 
numbers. 
The sample sizes correspond to these 
TABLE 1: The Size of the Sample 1968, 1973, 1977 and 
1981. 





It is not possible to calculate the proportion of the 
population comprised by these samples because the size of 
the population is unknown, but it was always greater than 
19 1 percent. 
2.1.2.4 Representativeness 
To overcome the absence of a population list, the co-
operatives were asked to select names from their members 
register according to certain criteria. This they agreed 
to do. They also undertook to approach the farmers 
concerned to request their participation in the survey. 
This non-random sample selection method makes it impossible 
to determine the degree of representativeness of the 
findings according to standard statistical criteria. 20 
Their generality is therefore a matter of opinion. 
The selection technique was nevertheless designed in such 
a way as to achieve a characteristic cross-section. The 
technique adopted by the Department of Agriculture in its 
21 annual surveys was to include "a representative number 
18 
of farms of all size groups ... (excluding only) exceptionally 
big farming business (and) very small farms which may 
be compared with small-holdings" 22 in its sample. "An 
attempt (was) also made to have the co-operating farmers 
spread evenly over the entire region and not merely 
d 0 t 0 t f ot ,23 concentrate 1n cer a1n par s o 1 . 
Co-operatives were asked to select respondents according to 
the two criteria, farm size and geographical location. In 
addition, they were explicitly requested to disregard the 
reputed 'efficiency' or 'inefficiency' of farmers. 
!.1.2.4.1 The size distribution of farming units 
There were several practical difficulties both in 
specifying the number of farming units in each size group, 
and in selecting farms to fit the specifications. The 
first of these was caused by the lack of adequate data. 
Most agricultural censuses do include frequency distribu-
tions of farming units according to surface area, by 
magisterial district. But these are the distributions of 
all farms, not of those that derive their income chiefly 
from maize. The co-operatives themselves are the best 
source of this information, but do not keep it in the form 
of neatly categorized frequency distributions. It is also 
confidential. Once more, it did not seem reasonable to 
ask for it to be categorized 
purposes of the survey. 
no small task for the 
So census data was used to gjve the co-operatjves a rough 
precedent, the largest and smallest census categories were 
excluded. But even so, at least two of the co-operatives 
experienced difficulty in finding members who met the 
requirements at the lower end of the scale, and it seemed 
that these categories were over-represented in the 
selection guide. In retrospect, this _is not surprising 
because the census data on which the guide was based was 
collected in 1976 no census statistics have been 
published since then. 24 And, as the findings of chapter 3 
25 show 
1 
the average surface area of farming units appears to 
have increased considerably since then. 
19 
Another problem in meeting the specifications concerned the 
13 year period of the study. Farming units which fell 
into one category in 1981 may have fallen into another in 
previous years. Again, chapter 3 shows that this happened 
frequently. Short of requesting the co-operatives to do a 
great deal of additional research, it would not have been 
possible to know this in advance, and even if it had been, 
it would have required either an extra-ordinary balancing 
act or the visiting of many extra farms, to obtain the 
right distribution in each of the 13 years. 
20 
Finally, not all the farmers who had been selected and who 
had agreed to participate, were available for interviews at 
times that could be accommodated in the author's schedule. 
Time and expense simply did not allow more than a limited 
amount of waiting and re-tracing of steps. Thoughtfully, 
the two larger co-operatives had placed more than the 
requisite number of names on the list, wpile the third made 
ad hoc telephone arrangements when necessary. But this did 
sometimes mean that farmers in the •wrong' size group had to 
be visited. 
In the end, practical difficulties overcame theoretical 
niceties, and the predetermined size distribution was 
abandoned. All that was attempted was, in a very rough and 
ready sort of way, to see that a 'reasonable' spread of 
farming units of different sizes was visited. Table 2 
overleaf suggests that this objective was met to a fair 
degree. 
The standard deviation 26 of the sample for 1981 indicates 
that the 'spread' was widest in that year. Not surprisingly, 
as the size of the sample and the mean became smaller 
working back towards 1968 so too did the standard 
d . . 27 ev1at1on. 
The 'fairness of ~he spread' depends not only on its breadth, 
but on its correspondence to the size distribution of the 
population as a whole. Table 3 overleaf compares the 
TABLE 2: The Distribution of the Gross Surface Area in 
Various Years of Farming Units Visited 
Area in 
1968 1973 1977 1981 
hectares %of sample %of sample %of sample %of sample 
0 199 4,2 3,1 0,0 8,5 
200 299 16,7 g 14 • 2,4 8,5 
300 499 29,1 25,0 41,5 22,0 
500 999 33,3 50,0 24,4 22,0 
1000 - 1999 12,5 9,4 19,5 25,4 
2000 and over 4,2 3,1 12,2 13,6 
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Mean (ha) 664 709 1033 1155 
Standard 
deviation (ha) 391 543 951 1202 
TABLE 3: The Distribution of the Gross Surface Area of 
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values in Table 2 for maize farms to census data for all 
farms in the region. 
The comparison is only rough because no census data on 
farms size ~s available in 1968, 1977 and 1981. The 
closest equivalents are to be found in the 1969 and 1976 
censuses. 
In the middle classes from 200 to 999 hectares the 
two distributions are fairly similar. Only in the 
smallest and largest classes is the comparison poor: the 
percentage of small farming units in Table 2 is dispropor-
tionately low, and that of large farming units dispropor-
tionately high, except in 1973. To some extent this 
reflects the intentional exclusion of very small farms, 
but since it was also the intention to exclude very large 
farms, it may be that the samples were unrepresentatively 
29 1 top-heavy 1 • Without more appropriate information, one 
cannot be certain about this, but in the analysis which 
follows, this qualification should be borne in mind. 
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2.1.2.4.2 The geographical distribution of farming units 
The second criterion by which the co-operatives were asked 
to select farms was geographical location. Many of the 
difficulties described in the previous section were 
encountered again. 
So, as before, all that was attempted eventually was "to 
have the co-operating farmers spread evenly over the 
entire region•• 30 , which, as Table 4 and FigurelA overleaf, 
illustrate was also achieved fairly satisfactorily. 
The dispersion was at its most even in 1981, the only year 
for which prior data was available. In earlier years, 
the pattern was fairly similar Wolmaransstad in 1968 
being the only notable exception. In practice, the 
dispersion in all four years was rather wider than is 
suggested by Figure lA, because a number o~ farming units 
consisted of tracts of land in two or more magisterial 
districts. 32 In FigurelA, the location of such farms is 
marked at the site of the owner's residence. 
Once more, though the population is not perfectly 
represented by census data, comparison of the distributions 
in Table 4 with the relevant census data shows the degree 
of representativeness of the samples. From Table 5 over-
leaf it can be seen that while the 'fit' is generally 
reasonable, Lichtenburg is consistently under-represented. 
The corresponding over-representation is shared more or 
less equally between Delareyville, Schweizer-Reneke and 
Wolmaransstad. For Coligny and Koster the match between 
census and sample is close. 
2.1.2.5 Reliability 
Errors in inferences about the population as a whole based 
on samples, may be divided into two categories: sampling 
errors and non-sampling errors. The first arise from the 
f~ct that data has been collected from a small proportion 
of the population, and so are inherent in all samples, 
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TABLE 4: The Geographical Distribution in Various Years of Farming Units Visited 
1968 1973 1977 1981 
Magisterial 
District 
No. of % of No. of % of No. of % of No. of %of 
Farms Sample Farms Sample Farms Sample Farms Sample 
Coligny 2 5,4 2 4,2 4 7,4 4 6,5 
Delareyville 6 16,2 8 16,7 9 16,7 12* 19,7 
Koster 6 16,2 6 12,5 8 14,8 10 16,4 
Lichtenburg 5 13,5 11 22,9 12 22,2 12 19,7 
Schweizer-Reneke 7 18,9 10 20,8 10 18,5 11 18,0 
Wolmaransstad 11 29,8 11 22,9 11 20,4 12 19,7 
TOTAL 37 100,0 48 100,0 54 100,0 61 100,0 
( * includes one farming unit in the Vryburg magisterial d' . 31) 1str1ct . 
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pp.34, 35. 
2. RSA, Department of Community Development, 
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1:250 000 topocadastral maps no's 2524, 2624, 
2724, 2526, 2626, 2726, Cape Town, 1980. 
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however carefully drawn. The second are caused by not 
adhering to sample specifications, or by recording incorrect 
information, and therefore depend on the care with which a 
sample is drawn and the data collected. 
2.1.2.5.1 Sampling error 
The degree of sampling error depends upon the degree of 
stability and representativeness of the sample. In the 
case of random samples, the probable sampling error can be 
estimated within chosen confidence limits. For non-random 
samples no such mathematical calculations can be made, but 
it is still possible to get a sense of the likely order and 
direction of sampling error from basic facts. For example, 
the fact that the sample size diminishes the farther back 
in time the collection of data goes, indicates that the 
degree of stability diminishes too. So the estimates for 
1981 are likely to have the least degree of sampling error, 
and those for 1968 the greatest. If the samples were 
random, the probable increase in the error would be less 
than proportionate to the decrease in the sample size 34 and 
it is probable that similar relationship exists here. 
The sample sizes in Table 1 corresp~nd to the maximum number 
of observations possible in each year. In many cases data 
is missing but generally the number of unrecorded or 
b . 1 . 
35 b t. . 11 0 1 o v1ous y 1ncorrect o serva 1ons 1s sma . n y 
instances where the number of errors and omissions is 
significant have been noted. 
Representativeness will have been reduced by three factors: 
(a) the unwillingness of some farmers to take part in the 
survey; 
(b) the inclusion of a disproportionately large number of 
very large farms and a correspondingly small number 
of very small farms; and 
(c) the under-representation of farms in the Lichtenburg 
magisterial district and the over-representation of 
29 
those in Delareyville, Schweizer-Reneke and Wolmarans-
stad. 
No record is available of the proportion of farmers 
contacted by the co-operatives who did not agree to be 
interviewed. But none of the co-operatives complained of 
difficulties in this respect. So it can be assumed that the 
incidence of refusal was not great. However, it could be 
argued that the data reflects rather better-than-average 
farming practice, because farmers who felt they had something 
to hide would have been more likely to refuse to be questioned. 
But even if this is so, it is not clear what the implications 
are for data on mechanization and employment. It could 
lead to an over-estimate of the former and an under-estimate 
36 of the latter, or quite the reverse. So the influence 
of factor (a) on sampling error cannot be predicted, but it 
is probably small. 
To the extent that factor (b) was present, the level of 
mechanization is likely to have been over-estimated and the 
level of employment under-estimated. The effect of factor 
(c) is less obvious. On the one hand, farming units in the 
Lichtenburg district on average produce more maize than 
those in Delareyille, Schweizer-Reneke and Wolmaransstad. 37 
So under-representing Lichtenburg may have led to under-
estimating mechanization and over-estimating employment. 
On the other hand, the average size of farming units appear 
to have grown faster in Delareyville, Schweizer-Reneke and 
Wolmaransstad than in Lichtenburg. 38 So, capital-
intensity and retrenchment may also have grown faster (in 
Delareyville, etc.). This assumes that output per farming 
unit and mechanization are positively related 39 an 
assumption borne out in practice. 40 
The relative strength of the factors is unknown. However, 
the presence of two factors which tend to cause an upward 
bias in estimates of the number of combines and a downward 
bias in estimates of the number of jobs as against one 
which does the opposite, suggests that the analysis may 
reflect a higher-than-average level of mechanization and a 
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No record is available of the proportion of farmers 
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difficulties in this respect. So it can be assumed that the 
incidence of refusal was not great. However, it could be 
argued that the data reflects rather better-than-average 
farming practice, because farmers who felt they had something 
to hide would have been more likely to refuse to be questioned. 
But even if this is so, it is not clear what the implications 
are for data on mechanization and employment. It could 
lead to an over-estimate of the former and an under-estimate 
of the latter, or quite the reverse. 36 So the influence 
of factor (a) on sampling error cannot be predicted, but it 
is probably small. 
To the extent that factor (b) was present, ~he level of 
mechanization is likely to have been over-estimated and the 
level of employment under-estimated. The effect of factor 
(c) is less obvious. On the one hand, farming units in the 
Lichtenburg district on average produce more maize than 
those in Delareyille, Schweizer-Reneke and Wolmaransstad. 37 
So under-representing Lichtenburg may have led to under-
estimating mechanization and over-estimating employment. 
On the other hand, the average size of farming units appear 
to have grown faster in Delareyville, Schweizer-Reneke and 
Wolmaransstad than in Lichtenburg. 38 So, capital-
intensity and retrenchment may also have grown faster (in 
Delareyville, etc.). This assumes that output per farming 
unit and mechanization are positively related 39 an 
. b . t. 40 assumpt1on orne out 1n prac 1ce. 
The relative strength of the factors is unknown. However, 
the presence of two factors which tend to cause an upward 
bias in estimates of the number of combines and a downward 
bias in estimates of the number of jobs as against one 
which does the opposite, suggests that the analysis may 
reflect a higher-than-average level of mechanization and a 
lower-than-average level of employment. But there is no 
reason to expect the distortion to be gross. 
2.1.2.5.2 Non-sampling error 
Much harder to assess, is the presence and influence of 
non-sampling errors. The source of such errors is 
incorrect information, recorded either because inaccurate 
answers were given to questions, or because questions were 
put to the wrong respondents. 
occurred. 
To some degree both 
Of the 61 farming units one in fact lay completely-outside 
the sampling frame, as can be seen in Figure 1~ In 
three other cases, while the farmer's residence lay just 
inside the boundary, some of the maize fields lay just 
outside it. Although there was a strong case for 
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excluding the former, and a weaker one for.excluding the 
latter, the information from all four was included. 41 None 
of the four displayed a pattern of mechanization and employ-
ment appreciably different from the overall, so the non-
sampling error from this source is likely to be negligible. 
The two most important reasons for incorrect answers are 
ambiguity in the questions and inaccurate records. 
Because most of the questions were of ·a fairly straight-
forward nature, seeking objective statistical or simple 
factual information rather than opinions 42 it is 
reasonable to discount ambiguity as a significant source 
of error. 
The possibility of error from inaccurate records needs much 
closer examination. Is it reasonable to expect accurate 
information from farmers on events that took place, in 
some cases, as long as 13 years ago? The answer depends on 
the nature of the information. Few farmers will remember 
or have year-by-year written records of the precise number 
of seasonal workers employed for maize harvesting and 
weeding. But, if one starts by asking each farmer what 
techniques he used to harvest and deliver maize, and when 
he changed from one technique to another, few farmers will 
have difficulty in remembering. Not one farmer in the 
survey had to look up written records to answer this. 
Attaching employment to techniques is easier than 
remembering it in the abstract. So farmers were then 
asked roughly how many workers they had employed with each 
technique, for how many weeks they had been employed, 
whether they had included men, women or children, where 
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they had been recruited, and so on. Because the number of 
jobs and the duration of employment varied from year to year, 
some farmers gave their answers in the form of a range, 
while others gave them as approximate averages. 
For this reason, the employment estimates in chapters 4 and 
5 should not be accorded undue accuracy: they are only 
approximate. But since almost all are averages, and since 
the object is merely to establish trends, not to make . 
precise calculations, the quality of the data is quite 
acceptable. Given the non-random nature of the samples, 
to have aimed for a greater degree of accuracy would have 
been inappropriate. The data in chapter 3 on 
techniques in use, farm size and yield per hectare is 
likely to be more accurate. 
The probable degree of non-sampling error therefore varies 
according to the variable. Where it is likely to have 
been greatest, this has been remarked on either in the 
text or in the footnotes. 43 But one generalization does 
seem in order: in common with sampling error, one can 
expect the size of the non-sampling error to increase with 
the age of the data. Both for statistical and for non-
statistical reasons the estimates for 1968 are likely to be 
less accurate than those for 1981. 
One other potential source of non-sampling error arises 
from what one could call 'class bias'. Because all the 
data was collected from farmers representing the 
interests of capital and because much of it concerned 
the employment, wages and working conditions of labour, 
the information could, consciously or unconsciously, have 
been biased in favour of capital. Perceptions of matters 
involving opposing class interests are likely to depend on 
the class to which the respondent belongs. The ideal 
would have been to interview both farmers and workers. On 
farms.this was generally not possible, and might even have 
44 been counter-productive in the case of permanent workers . 
But the off-farm residence of seasonal workers out of 
season made it easier to interview them. 
It was partly with the intention of assessing the degree of 
non-sampling error that a second field trip, to the 
Transkei, was undertaken. This aspect of the research is 
described in detail in section 2.2. What is relevant 
here is that, in the course of the trip, seasonal workers 
employed in 1981 and previously on four of the farms 
visited, were interviewed, and the same questions 
concerning inter alia the number of workers employed, the 
durations of employment and the payment of wages were 
asked. Quite without prompting, most of the answers bore 
a close resemblance to those given by the farmers 
concerned. It was hoped to continue this exercise in 
Bophuthatswana, where the majority of seasonal workers not 
·d t h't f l1've. 45 But t1'me d1'd not res1 en on w 1 e arms, 
permit. While the four farms for which it was possible to 
cross-check information only represent about six percent of 
the total, the corroboration received in these cases does 
suggest that the error resulting from class bias is not 
serious. 
2.1.2.6 Comparability of samples 
b 180 h f . . . 46 d From a out ours o 1nterv1ew1ng more ata was 
collected than could be analyzed manually for each of the 
13 years. Partly for this reason and partly because of the 
/ 
problem of comparability47 , it was decided to select four 
years for close scrutiny. The years chosen were 1968, 
1973, 1977 and 1981, which divided the 13 years into three 
l l . d 48 more or ess equa per1o s. 
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those from whom information was available from 
1938 onwards, which included the 37 farmers 
those from whom information was available from 
1973 onwards, which included the 37 in group A 
plus a further 11; making a total of 48 
those from whom information was available from 
1977 onwards, which included the 48 of group B 
plus a further 6; making a total of 54 
those from whom information was available in 
1981, which included the entire group of 61 
farmers. 
The four correspond to the four samples whose sizes are 
reflected in Table 1. 
An alternative procedure would have been to divide the 61 
into four mutually exclusive groups, namely, those from 
whom information could be obtained for all 13 years; those 
for whom this was possible only for 8 years; and so on. 
The size of the respective samples would then have been 37, 
11, 6 and 7. Tms method was rejected because only the 
largest sample would have had a reasonable degree of 
statistical stability. 
One complication inherent in the classification that was 
adoptecr concerns comparability. If one wishes to compare 
say, the percentage of the maize crop harvested mechanically 
in 1968 with the analogous percentage in 1973, 1977 and 
1981, the ideal is to use the same sample, say group A, 
each year. If the percentage for group A in 1968 is 
compared with the percentage from group B in 1973, group C 
in 1977 and group D in 1981, the level of comparability is 
not as high. On the other hand, the strength of this 
method is that it uses the maximum amount of information 
in each year. Both approaches have something to 
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recommend them, and so it was decided to make both 
possible in presenting the data. This is the reason why 
most of the tables in chapters 3, 4 and 5 take the 
following form: 
Group 1968 1973 1977 1981 
A X X X X 
B X X X 
c X X 
D X 
Each x stands for a particular value. By definition, no 
information was available for groups B, C and D in 1968, 
groups C and D in 1973, and group D in 1977. 
In graphing the data, to make trends-more easily discernible, 
only the values for group A in 1968, group B in 1973, group 
C in 1977, and group D in 1981 have been represented. Thus, 
while the maximum amount of data has been used in each year, 
the level of comparability is less than the maximum 49 
This should be borne in mind when interpreting the graphs. 
The whole technique of analysis and representation is like 
taking a series of snapshot stills as opposed to shooting 
a movie. The detail of the movie is richer, but more 
difficult to take in, whereas the snapshot misses out what 
happens between pictures, but makes it easier to study and 
compare what is in them. It is hoped that this technique 
will leave readers in no doubt as to the magnitude of many 
of the changes that have occurred on maize farms in the 
Western Transvaal since 1968. 
2.1.3 Organization of survey 
For a variety of reasons, farmers are often reluctant to 
be interviewed. 50 It is therefore advisable to approach 
them through an acceptable channel, such as agricultural 
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co-operatives 51 of which most are membeFs. 52 The three 
co-operatives from whom assistance was requested were most 
helpful, both in securing the participation of farmers and 
in giving practical advice on how to organize the survey. 
It is no empty acknowledgement to say that without their 
help, the field research would not have been possible. 
The survey was conducted during the second half of February 
and March (1982) a relatively slack season on most 
. £ 53 ma.1ze arms. This made it easier to arrange interviews, 
but it did mean that the harvesting operations that were 
the focus of the research were not in progress. 54 
Fortunately this was not essential because when the idea of 
the research was first mooted in 1979 the full range 
of basic harvesting techniques had been observed. 55 An 
additional advantage of undertaking the field research 
before the harvesting season was that it was possible to 
interview a number of seasonal workers in an off-farm 
56 situation shortly afterwards. 
The pattern of interviews was roughly as follows: from the 
list of names, addresses and telephone numbers 57 supplied 
b th . 58 h f 11 f y e co-operat.1ves , t e names o a sma group o 
59 farmers living not too far apart were selected. These 
farmers were then contacted by telephone to arrange 
suitable meeting times. 60 Since most interviews lasted 
about three hours, it was never possible to organize more 
than two in a day. 61 
The first half-hour of interviews was generally taken up 
. h 1 . 62 w.1t casua conversat.1on , after which the formal business 
of working through the questionnaire was tackled. All 
interviews were conducted in the language of the 
respondent's choice, which, in most instances, was 
Afrikaans. 63 The importance of this cannot be over-
estimated. It is also difficult to exaggerate the value of 
. . 64 1 1 face-to-face .1nterv.1ews: not on y was a near-compete 
65 response but often almost as much as to be learnt 
from casual conversation as from the questionnaire. 66 
2.2 THE SURVEY OF SEASONAL WORKERS IN THE TRANSKEI 
By comparison to the survey of farmers, the preparation 
and organization of the survey of seasonal workers was 
rudimentary. Though a questionnaire was drawn up and 
used (see Appendix B below), so that there was some 
system to the gathering of information, informality and 
improvisation were the hallmarks of the survey. So it 
was in no sense a sampling survey, and the evidence that 
was collected, though valuable, was in no way amenable to 
detailed statistical analysis. Sheer lack of data about 
the population would have made formal sampling impossible 
even had this been contemplated. 
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The visit to the Transkei was undertaken partly to try to 
corroborate the information given by farmers 67 , but more to try 
to find out more about the characteristics of seasonal 
workseekers. Initially two trips were planned, one to the 
Transkei and the other to Bophuthatswa~a, the two main off-
farm sources of seasonal workers, 68 ~but time allowed only 
one. It was carried out over about a week in early May (1982) 
just prior to the departure of workers to the Transvaal and 
Orange Free State for the start of the harvesting season. 
One or the questions farmers had been asked concerned the 
place of residence of seasonal workers. It emerged that 
several farmers employed teams assembled and controlled by 
the same man. Though no-one knew his surname, it appeared 
that he lived near Dordrecht in the North-Eastern Cape, and 
that he owned a shop and some trucks. 
In Dordrecht, an evening in the •pub' and a morning's 
questioning of shop-keepers, workers and officials led 
eventually to his name69 and whereabouts in the village 
Umhlanga 70 , on the railway line between Dordrecht and 
Indwe, just inside the Transkei border. Through this 
connection, contact was established with other men in the 
village who also assembled teams of seasonal workers who 
were employed inter alia in the Western Transvaal, and 
those contacts led in turn to several others. In all, 
nine such •foremen• and several other people who had 
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worked in seasonal teams were interviewed in three 
villages Umhlanga, Macubeni 71 and St. Augustine's 
in the Glen Grey magisterial district. (See Figure 32, 
below. ) 
From discussions with farmers, it was also apparent that 
seasonal workers had in the past been recruited from 
Sterkspruit 72 in the Herschel magisterial district. In 
that part of the Transkei it turned out that recruiting was 
done on a rather different basis: whereas in Glen Grey 
teams were put together by foremen who were in direct 
contact with farmers 73 , in Herschel most recruiting was done 
by labour agencies operating from Sterkspruit. Officials 
of four agencies 74 were interviewed, and it was established 
that only one acted on behalf of Western Transvaal farmers 
75 and did so only on a very small scale. 
Most discussions took place in a mixture of Xhosa, English 
and Afrikaans. The author does not speak Xhosa, but was 
able to arrange to be accompanied in Glen Grey by a member 
of the community who was thoroughly trilingual. 
Only a part of the information gathered in the Transkei 
was drawn on directly 76 in writing this thesis. It is 




FACTORS INFLUENCING EMPLOYMENT .: 
CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY, FARM SIZE AND YIELD 
Many factors have a bearing on the number and characteristics 
of workers a farmer will employ to harvest his maize crop. 
In terms of neo-classical price theory, they are summed up 
in the demand and supply curves for labour. These are held 
to determine both the number of workers who will find 
employment and the wage rate they will receive. This 
chapter concerns neither the wage rate nor more fundamen-
tally the validity of the neo-classical model. It 
accepts the framework afforded by the model, and focuses on 
the three variables which appear to be the most important, 
determinants of the position of the demand curve, and there-
by, to a large extent, of the number of workers employed. 
It will be shown later that these factors influence not only 
the number of workers but also their characteristics. 
The three variables concerned are technology, the surface 
area of farming units and the crop Yield per hectare. Of 
the three, technology has the most profound long-term 
influence. 
3.1 CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY1 
The annual agricultural cycle on maize farms in the Western 
Transvaal starts with the first spring rains, usually in 
October. The moisture softens the rock-like winter ground 
making it easier to plough and more welcoming as a seed-bed. 
Ploughing and planting have to be done quickly before the 
moisture evaporates or drains away, leaving the soil 
unworkable again. So spring planting is a time of 
concentrated activity, with farmers and workers often using 
tractors and planting equipment from before daybreak until 
well into the night. But because this is largely a 
mechanical operation nowadays, there is no call for large 
teams of seasonal workers. Nor are they needed for the 
less hurried activities that follow soon after ~ the 
spraying of chemical weed-killers and the spreading of 
fertilizer. 
Only when the khaki-bush, the castor-oil bush and the 
wild oats which are resistant to most weed-killers -
appear in December or January do farmers think of calling 
in seasonal workers. By this stage, the maize is 
usually too high to take tractors into the fields to plough 
up the weeds. This is still possible if the rows are wide 
enough to let a small tractor in, but generally they are 
planted more closely now, and there are other reasons 
for example, to do with soil compaction why this method 
of controlling weeds is no longer popular. 
By February or March most weeding is over. The maize has 
started to lose its greenness and little needs to be done 
until it is dry enough for harvesting in May or June. If 
ground-nuts or sunflowers or sorghum have been planted 
harvesting activities start a month or two earlier. 
Sunflowers and sorghum are harvested almost entirely by 
combine nowadays, although the work of gathering the left-
overs 'agter die masjien' 'gleaning' to be more 
formal is still done by hand. In contrast, ground-
nuts are still mostly reaped manually and call for a good 
deal of seasonal labour for a short period. 
So, if they are lucky, seasonal work-seekers may find 
almost continuous employment from December to August. 
But it is not until the maize has ripened that most activity 
begins. Then, as in the planting season, work starts 
early as soon as the frost has melted and goes on 
until darkeness falls, and often later for combines with 
lights. This is the time when almost every farmer hires 
seasonal workers whether it is for the full, traditional 
reap, thresh, bag, and 
or to glean after the 
gamut of harvesting activities 
deliver, a rarity nowadays 




the harvest is in the sooner farmer and worker get paid, 
and the shorter the season the earlier the ploughing that 
2 completes the cycle can be done. 
Changes in technology have affected almost every activity 
in the agricultural cycle and continue to do so. Only 
three sorts of activity are considered here the most 
important of thos~ which have traditionally involved 
seasonal workers, namely weeding and harvesting and 
delivering the maize crop. 
One could argue that harvesting and delivery are simply 
two parts of the same activity. They are distinguished 
here because it is possible to alter the technology of one 
without changing that of the other. 
separate operation altogether. 
3.1.1 Harvesting 
Weeding is clearly a 
'Harvesting' is taken to refer to the two separate 
operations, reaping or removing the 'head' from the 
stalk and threshing or removing the seeds from the 
head. Both can be done by hand or mechanically but it is 
many years since maize was last threshed by hand in the 
Western Transvaal. In describing the various techniques, 
hand threshing is not considered. The basic alternatives 
are therefore: reaping by hand and threshing mechanically, 
or reaping and threshing with the same machine, i.e. 
(mechanical) 'combine' harvesting. In both cases, a 
number of variations are possible. 
3.1.1.1 Hand harvesting 
As one would expect, hand-reapers walk down the rows 
normally though not always one to a row pickmg the 
heads from the stalks and putting them into a sack which 
they carry with them. Most farmers keep their empty 
plastic fertilizer bags for this purpose. 
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The sacks can be handled in various ways: 
(i) they can be emptied in a heap at the edge of the 
field, which means that the threshing machine must 
be moved from heap to heap; 
(ii) they can be placed (unemptied) in a heap for 
collection and transport to the threshing machine 
(which stays in one place); 
(iii) they can be emptied directly onto a trailer drawn 
by a tractor which moves slowly through the fields 
with the reapers. When the trailer is full, the 
load is taken to the threshing machine (which again 
stays in one place). This is known as 
1
hand 
harvesting in bulk'. 
Method (iii) seems to have become the most widely-used 
before the adoption of mechanical harvesting: about 75 
percent of farmers 3 said that they had been using it at the 
time of the change, as were most of the farmers who were 
still harvesting wholely or partly by hand in 1981. 4 
A survey of about 100 Western Transvaal maize farmers 
undertaken by the Department of Agricu+ture in 19675 , 
found that more than 70 percent of farmers were using 
method (ii) at that stage, and only about 13 percent method 
(iii). So there must have been a considerable swing in 
favour of the latter during the later •60s and early •70s, 
before harvest- mechanization occurred. Because it 
involved the re-organization of existing resources rather 
than the purchase of new capital equipment, it is easy to 
dismiss this change of technique as being of little impor-
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tance. In fact, as is explained later, this re-organization 
saved more labour than the silos which were were being built 
at about the same time although silos may have had a more 
profound influence on the pattern of employment in the long 
run. 
The number of workers and the capital equipment is much 
the same for all three methods. Typically, a team of 
seasonal workers, anything between ten and two or three 
hundred strong is employed to do the reaping, while the 
tractors used for transporting the heads for threshing, 
which may vary from one to a small fleet, are driven by 
permanent workers. 
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Threshing machines are really little more than horizontally 
rotating cylindrical sieves through which the heads, leaves 
and all, ('blaarkoppe') are passed. The dryness of the 
maize6 and the violent motion ensure that the leaves are 
quickly torn off and the seeds loosened from the cobs. 
The seeds fall through the sieve into a chute to which a 
sack is attached, and the cobs and leaves fall out of the 
lower end of the sieve. 7 The machines are powered by a 
tractor. Most combines, however large and sophisticated, 
operate on the same principle, though they may have their 
own power source. Threshing machines are frequently 
still used to process the gleanings picked up behind the 
combine. 
Reaping and threshing may be carried out simultaneously or 
in sequence. Where they are done simultaneously the team 
of seasonal workers is divided in two, most of the men 
staying with the threshing machine to do the heavy work of 
handling sacks. 8 Often, though, the whole team reaps, 
and then, when sufficient heads have been collected, 
changes to threshing and delivery. From the point of view 
of employment, the difference in technique is not important. 
9 On nearly 80 percent of farms in the survey , only one 
threshing machine is or was used. So, in most instances 
the requisite capital equipment for threshing would be one 
tractor and one threshing machine, only one tractor 
driver a permanent worker is called for, and two 
or three seasonal workers to keep the hopper of the 
threshing machine ful1. 10 
3.1.1.2 Combine harvesting 
11 In contrast to wheat , maize was harvested entirely by 
hand until the 1950s when mechanical combine-harvesters 
made their appearance in South Africa. Then, for the 
first time, farmers were faced with a choice between 
fundamentally different harvesting techniques different 
not only in physical process, but also in the proportions 
of capital and labour involved. 
For a decade or so combines made little impact. One can 
suggest several reason for this: the experimental nature 
of the machines, the relative ease with which seasonal 
12 13 workers could be found , the smaller size of farms , and 
information and learning costs. 14 It was not until the 
middle '70s that mechanical harvesting became the rule 
h th h . 15 rat er an t e except1on. 
The first combines were pulled by tractors and took their 
power from the propeller shaft of the tractor.· For this 
reason they are often called 'PTO' (power take-off) 
combines. By comparison to later generations of combines, 
they are simple, robust, reliable, well-suited to smaller 
farming units, and relatively inexpensive, so it is not 
surprising to find that the majority of combines currently 
in use in the Western Transvaal are still of this type. 
In the late 1960s a second fundamental change in the 
range of harvesting techniques occurred with the marketing 
of the first self -propelled ( 'SP' ) combines. These, as the 
name implies, were no longer drawn by tractors but were 
equipped with their own engine. They also had a 
considerably greater intake capacity which made it possible 
to harvest the same area with fewer machines and drivers. 
But relative to PTO combines, they are more complex, 
temperamental, suited to larger farming units, and 
expensive to buy and maintain. 
The mechanical process is similar for the two types of 
combine. The machines move down the rows either cutting 
off the plants near the base and taking them in in their 
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entirety, or, in the latest models, stripping just the head 
from the stalk by means of revolving spiral. Whichever 
technique is used, the threshing process is much the same 
as described above, though there may be more than one 
rotating sieve. The threshed seeds are collected in a 
tank which is emptied periodically into a truck or trailer 
by an auger. 16 This can be done either when the combine is 
stationary or while it is moving. 
Opinions vary as to the relative efficiency of combines and 
hand-harvesters, but even farmers most convinced of the 
17 superiority of machines still employ seasonal workers to 
supplement them. Gleaning behind the combine is almost 
universal. 
Sometimes, hand harvesting is the only option, for example, 
where many plants have been blown over, or where rain has 
made the ground marshy. A few farmers who use combines 
also choose to harvest a proportion of the crop by hand, 
generally either to attract seasonal workers who would 
otherwise be reluctant to take on gleaning (wage rates for 
gleaning are usually lower than for harvesting18 ), or to 
leave the stalks standing for fodder. 19 
In addition, the planting pattern may make it less efficient 
to reap some rows mechanically. In most instances rows are 
planted at intervals which match the intake equipment of 
farmers• combines. But ease-of-harvesting is only one of 
several considerations in the never-ending debate about 
ideal row-width and sometimes the spacing of rows is such 
that a small part of the crop has to be harvested by hand 
if an unnecessary waste of fuel is to be avoided .. 
The advent and growing sophistication of combines have 
therefore not led to the complete disappearance of 
seasonal employment at harvest-time, although they have 
certainly brought about a massive contraction in jobs. 20 
·~pically mechanical reaping and threshing call for one or 
more SP combines and/or PTO combines and tractors; the 
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equivalent number of drivers 21 and, in the case of PTO 
combines, an additional worker travelling on each combine 
to clear blockages, etc.; and a team of seasonal workers 
for gleaning and perhaps for hand-harvesting a few rows. 
3.1.1.3 The incidence and nature of change in harvesting 
techniques 
The simplest and most direct way of measuring the rate of 
diffusion of harvest-mechanization is to classify farming 
units according to basic technique hand or combine 
over a period of time. Also, farmers might use both 
techniques simultaneously this in_troduces an addi-
tional category. Table 6 has been constructed using 
the "snapshot" method described above. 
22 
Table 6 and Figure 2 overleaf, show the pattern of change 
clearly. At the start of the 13 year period, about 80 
percent of farming units were harvesting exclusively by 
hand. By the end, almost 90 percent were using combines 
only. Those who used both methods never represented more 
than a few percent. Surprisingly perhaps, the 'cross-
over' year was reached only in 1974. 
If the period 1968 - 73 saw a substantial number of farmers 
opting for combines, the four years that followed saw a 
still more substantial degree of change. This left little 
further scope for mechanization, and in the years between 
1977 and 1981 only a few more farmers moved from hand 
harvesting to machines. The reasons for the acceleration 
that occurred between 1974 and 1977 are not immediately 
clear. However, one factor was almost certainly the 
record crop harvested in 1974, and the above-average 
harvests that followed in 1975 and 1977. 23 These would 
both have placed a strain on seasonal labour resources and 
have encouraged the purchase of machinery by providing 
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A second and equally powerful factor was the increase in 
the size of farming units. 24 Although the average 
surface area seems to have increased continuously throughout 
the 13 years, the rate of increase between 1973 and 1977 was 
quite extra-ordinary: for group B (the largest comparable 
group) the average rise was 51 percent and for group A no 
less than 65 percent. The relative advantages of 
combines increase with the area harvested.
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Another important factor was the installation of bulk 
handling and storage facilities, which generally preceded 
the transition to mechanical harvesting. In essence, the 
building of silos eliminated the need for men in seasonal 
delivery teams, and this in turn made it possible by 
introducing combines to replace the large teams 
recruited in black rural areas with smaller teams drawn 
from local sources, which appears to have had several 
advantages for farmers. 
in section 3.1.2.3 below. 
This is discussed in more depth 
Finally, the rise in mining and industrial wages that 
began in the early '70s 26 , and the active policy of the 
mines to recruit more of its workers from within South 
Africa's borders 27 , almost certainly attracted a significant 
number of male farm workers away from farm work. 
All of these factors would have encouraged harvest mechani-
zation. 
Because farming units vary considerably in size, a more 
informative method of showing the transition process is to 
show the changing proportions of the total surface area 
or better still of the total crop harvested by the 
various methods. Complete details of the area and tonnage 
harvested were not collected which makes it impossible to 
calculate these statistics accurately. However enough 
data is available to estimate the relative areas reasonably 
28 well using weighted averages. Table 7 and Figure 3 are 
constructed on this basis: 
TABLE 7 The Diffusion of Mechanical Harvesting 
Techniques 
(Percentage of Total Maize Area Harvested 
Using Each Basic Technique) 
Technique I Year 1968 1973 1977 1981 
70 54 11 3 
Combine 26 41 83 87 
Hand and Combine 4 5 6 10 
For 1981, when sufficient data was available to calculate 
the respective areas precisely, the division was: hand 
2 percent, combine 89 percent, hand and combine 9%. 
Splitting the last category into its two components, one 
arrives at the overall division: hand 5 percent, combine 
95 percent. 
Comparison of Tables 6 and 7 suggests that most of the first 
farmers who used combines cultivated areas that were larger 
than average. The 16 percent of farming units on which 
maize was harvested mechanically in 1968 accounted for as 
much as 26 percent of the total area harvested. This is 
what one would expect since the rtlative benefits to 
farmers of using combines both financially and in terms 
of organization increase as the area to be harvested 
increases. 
In 1973 and 1977 the difference between the proportion of 
fdrming units using the various techniques and the corre-
sponding areas,is much smaller never more than 3 percent. 
This indicates that large and small farmer alike were 
choosing in favour of combines. This pattern continued in 
the last 4-year period, the only noteworthy difference 
concerning hand-harvest1ng in 1981: the 3 percent of the 
total surface area harvested by the 7 percent of farmers 






























































smallest farmers who were still using manual techniques. 
Again, this is what one would expect. 
Table 8 shows the percentage of farming-units in the 
various groups using the two types of combine-harvester. 29 
It is uncertain whether SP combines were available in the 
Western Transvaal by 1968, but whatever the case, all the 
combines in use at that point were tractor-drawn. The 
first SP combines went into use in the early '70s. PTOs 
generally seem to have been preferred to SPs: even in the 
years between 1973 and 1977 when the use of SPs spread most 
rapidly, purchases of PTOs grew proportionately faster. 
Sincel977 there has actually been a reduction in the number 
of farms using SP combines. Many farmers complained of 
the unreliability of these machines and of the high cost 
and difficulty of maintaining them, and repYaced or aug-
mented them with PTO combines. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, considering the substantial capital 
outlay and the proportion of the year for which combines 
stand idle, few farmers have ever employed harvesting 
30 contractors and equally few have shared the ownership and 
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use of a combine. 31 Almost all farmers own the harvesting 
machinery they use. The reasons for this do not need 
discussing, and the consequences for employment appear to 
have been minimal. 
Of the minor crops produced in the Western Transvaal, 
groundnuts and sunflowers are the most important. 32 
Details of harvesting techniques were not collected in the· 
same depth as for maize, but it appears that groundnuts are 
still harvested by hand on most farms 33 , while sunflowers 
have for some years been processed almost entirely by SP 
combines. 34 When groundnuts ripen, they need to be 
harvested quickly to prevent the pods from being torn off 
when the plants are pulled from the ground. The haste 
means that as many workers as possible are taken on and 
planting is generally limited to a relatively small 35 area. 
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For sunflowers, most farmers employ gleamers to work behind 
the combine, many of whom stay on for the much longer maize 
season and may also have been employed previously for 
d
. 36 wee ~ng. 
3.1.2 Delivery 
3.1.2.1 
In the main maize producing regions of South Africa, 
farmers are obliged by law to sell all threshed ordinary 
maize 37 to the Maize Board. This is done through agricul-
tural co-operatives, who also store the grain before despatch 
to purchasers. The farmer's final task is therefore to 
deliver his crop to a co-operative depot. There are two 
ways in which this may be done: in sacks or in bulk. 38 
Delivery in sacks 
If the crop has been reaped by hand, it is passed through 
a threshing machine and emerges from an outlet chute into 
sacks. When a sack has been filled, the flow is cut off 
momentarily by closing the chute and the full sack is 
removed and replaced by an empty one. On the other hand, 
if the crop has been harvested by combine, the contents of 
the combine's tank will have been discharged every now and 
. . b lk . 1 39 M . 1 . d aga~n ~nto a u -tra~ er. ost tra~ ers are equ~ppe 
with a sluice, which makes transferring the grain into 
sacks simple. If the trailer is not filled in this way, 
an auger can be used or the maize can be shovelled into 
sacks on the trailer. 
All delivery sacks nowadays hold 70kg of maize, though in 
days gone by the standard weight was 200lb ( 90 kg). When 
a bag is full it should contain about 70 kg, but the exact 
weight needs to be checked before it can be sealed. So 
from the threshing machine or trailer sacks are moved to a 
scale and are topped up or emptied a little as need be. 
With the weight correct, they are sewn closed, ready for 
loading onto a truck or trailer. 
Lifting 70 kg sacks is no easy task, especially when it has 
to be done all day and sometimes well into the night. Only 
men can be employed to do this a requirement which often 
creates difficulties when it comes to raising a team of 
seasonal workers. 40 Normally four men one at each 
corner of the sack are assigned to loading, and another 
two on the truck itself for stacking and helping with 
unloading at the depot. Even for moving the sack from the 
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threshing machine to the scale, two are needed, and another 
two to move it off and seal it. So usually at least ten men 
would be involved in the delivery process at the farmer's 
end. Then, of course, each truck or tractor towing a 
trailer needs a driver 41 , and, unless the farm is small, two 
or more vehicles are used to ply between the threshing machine 
and the depot. 
At the depot the sequence is: weighing the trailer with its 
42 full cargo , sampling the delivery for grading, off-loading, 
weighing the empty trailer, and stacking. For these tasks 
the farmer's workers are joined by a team from the depot, 
and the whole operation should take no more than about 20 
minutes for a standard 90 sack load. 43 In practice, turn-
round time depends largely on the length of the queue and 
can take several hours at peak periods. 
In all then, as far as indiv~dual farmers are concerned, 
delivery in sacks calls for investment in one or more 
trucks or tractors and trailers, a scale, sacks and twine, 
a team of, say, twelve or more workers most of whom are 
seasonal - and many hours of work. The farming community 
as a whole as represented by the co-operative is 
required to provide covered storage space, tarpaulins, a 
conveyor, stacking system, a .weighbridge and grading equip-
ment and to employ a substantial team of workers. 
~.2 Delivery in bulk 
From the point of view of workers delivery in bags 
represents a substantial number of jobs: from the point 
of view of farmers, on the other hand, it is a time-
consuming and expensive operation. It is not surprising 
therefore that since the early 1960s 44 , co-operatives in 
the Western Transvaal have invested millions of rands in 
bulk handling and storage facilities. The towering 
concrete silos that one can see from so far away in the 
flatness of the Western Transvaal are the most obvious 
manifestation of these. 
Whatever its merits or demerits in terms of substituting 
capital for labour, handling and storing grain in bulk 
certainly substitutes a relatively simple process for a 
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more complicated one. On farms the output of the threshing 
machine or combine is allowed to flow directly into a bulk 
trailer. Hand-labour is required only to spread the flow 
evenly with a shovel. In other words, the need for filling 
and weighing each individual is eliminated, not to mention 
the sweat of handling thousands of sacks. 
At the depot, the weight of the load is again determined 
by weighing the entire truck or trailer, first fully loaded 
and then empty. Off-loading is simply a matter of letting 
down the side of the trailer and shovelling the load into 
a chute. 45 Or, if a specially-built V-shaped bulk 
delivery trailer is being used, all that is necessary is to 
open the sluices in the bottom of the truck. Also, 
sampling for grading no longer requires the opening of 
sacks. 
van Wyk estimates that even with the slower of the two 
off-loading methods, the complete delivery process at the 
depot takes roughly half as long in bulk as it does in 
sacks. 46 This of course, takes no account of the likeli-
hood of having to wait in a queue which, whatever the 
technique, is where most delivery time is usually spent. 
Ceteris paribus, one would expect this to be shorter at 
depots with bulk handling facilities. 
The main items of capital required for delivery in bulk are 
therefore: for farmers individually, one or more trucks, or 
tractors and trailers with closed sides, or special bulk 
delivery trailers. Each truck or tractor and trailer 
needs a driver, and except for the special trailers, one or 
two workers with shovels. Most, if not all, are permanent 
workers. So less labour but more capital is involved 
(than for delivery in sacks). 
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For farmers collectively, the number of workers needed at 
the depot would probably be smaller, but this is insignifi-
cant when measured against the increase in investment called 
for: most silo complexes cost in excess of Rl million at 
present 1982 prices. 
3.1.2.3 The incidence of change in handling and storage 
techniques 
As before, the simplest way of measuring the rate of diffu-
sion of the new technology is to divide farming units into 
those on which it had and those on which it had not been 
adopted, in a time series. This is done in Table 9, while 








9 The Diffusion of Bulk Handling and Storage 
Techniques. 
(Percentage of Farming Units of which 
Maize was delivered in Sacks and in Bulk) 
1968 19 73 1977 1981 
Sacks Bulk Sacks Bulk Sacks Bulk Sacks Bulk 
56 44 26 74 0 100 0 100 
25 75 0 100 0 100 
2 98 0 100 
0 100 
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In 1968 more than half of farmers were still delivering in 
sacks whereas by 1973 fewer than a quarter were. 
sacks were effectively a thing of the past. 47 
By 1977 
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By comparing Table 9 with Table 6, it can be seen that the 
development of silo capacity generally preceded the transi-
tion to mechanical harvesting. In 1968 44 percent of 
farmers were already delivering their crop in bulk whereas 
less than 20 percent were using combines. Five years later 
the respective percentages were 75 and 44. By 1977 almost 
all farmers were delivering bulk while 13 percent were still 
harvesting solely by hand. Only 15 percent of farmers in 
the survey started using combines before phasing o~t delivery 
in sacks. 
It will be shown later that the adoption. of bulk delivery 
techniques changed employment patterns not only directly as 
just described, but also indirectly by making it easier to 
substitute smaller teams of seasonal workers drawn from the 
families of permanent workers and consisting of women and 
children only, for larger teams recruited in black rural 
area and including men. 
A more accurate measure of the spread of the new technique 
is the percentage of the entire crop delivered in bulk. 
The data does not permit a precise calculation, but it is 
possible to make a reasonable estimate. 48 Table 10 shows 
the results, and Figure 5 graphs them. 
TABLE 10: The Diffusion or Bulk Handling And Stbrage 
Techniques for Maize 
(Percentage of Crop Delivered in Sacks and in Bulk) 
Year 1968 1973 1977 1981 
Sacks 46 23 0 0 
Bulk 54 77 100 100 
Comparison of Tables 9 and 10 49 shows that the areas in 
which silos were sited first, were those in which output 
per farming unit was significantly greater than average. It 
appears that these districts mostly comprised the land 
surrounding the larger towns in the region50 and probably 
also the prime maize producing land. 
By examining the increase in total silo capacity and its 
geographical distribution, one can get a more immediate 
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sense of the diffusion of bulk handling and storage techniques. 
Table 11 and Figure 6 record the growth of total silo 
capacity, while Table 12 and Figure 7 give details of its 
location. The silos included are only those constructed by 
the three co-operatives concerned51, within or just outside 
the boundaries of the six magisterial districts surveyed, 
where the farmers in the sample would have been most likely 
to deliver. 
Table 11 shows that total silo capacity in the region 
increased by no less than 340 percent between 1968 and 
1981. 52 The most rapid (absolute) period of growth again 
seems to have been between 1973 and 1977, though the 
differences between this and the periods before and after 
is less marked than in the case of harvesting techniques 
(see Figures 6 and 3). 
TABLE 11: The Growth of Total Silo Capacityin the 
Western Transvaal ( '000 Tonnes Maize) 
Co-operative 1968 1973 1977 
1981 
697 965 1562 1886 Noord-Wes 
Suid-Wes Transvaal 157 328 
551 720 
2 110 146 146 Koster 
855 1403 2259 2 752 TOTAL 
- _, 
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TABLE 12 Continued. 
Site 1968 1973 1977 1981 
Madibogo X XX xxxx 
Mafikeng X 
Mareetsane X XX 
Migdol X XX xxxx 
Nooitgedacht X 
Oppaslaagte X XX 






Suid-Wes Transvaal Kooperasie 
Amalia XX 
Bamboesspruit XX XXX 
Hallatshope XX 
Kameel X XX 
Kingswood XX 
Leeudoringstad X XX 
Makwassie X XXX 
Migdol X XX XXX 
Schweizer-Reneke XX XXX 
Wolmaransstad XX XXX 
(Continued overleaf) 
TABLE 12 Continued. 
Site 1968 1973 1977 1981 
Koster Kooperasie 
Derby X 
Groot pan XX 
Koster X 
Syferbult X 
Source: Information supplied by Co-operatives
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To make the relative importance of the many depots easier 
to take in at a glance, their capacities have been divided 
into categories represented by an appropriate number of Xs 
in Table 12. 
The 44 silos in the region are widely distributed placing 
nearly all farmers within easy reach of bulk facilities. 
In addition to the depots listed in Table 12, there are a 
number of other depots which still receive maize in sacks 
only, but these are few and smal1. 54 As one would expect, 
most silos are sited on railway lines. Those that are not 
and are obliged to make use of bulk road transport are all 
in the under-40 000 metric ton category. 
Why were silos built? And why in those particular periods? 
The most likely reason for their construction is that it is 
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cheaper to handle grain in bulk. Certainly it is quicker 
and easier. 
Since the construction of bulk facilities involves such 
an enormous substitution of capital for labour, if it 
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FIGURE 7: The Geographical Distribution of Bulk Handling 
and Storage Facilities. 
KEY 
(Map to be read in conjunction with Table 12. 
e GERDAU - site of silo served by one co-operative 
4t GROOTPAN - site of silos served by two co-operatives 
• PRETORIA - main cities/towns outside survey region 
area covered by six magisterial districts 
included in the survey. 
- South Africa in Botswana border 
-Bophuthatswana bounda~y (1975) 
------- - provincial boundaries 
.................... - magisterial district boundaries 
IIIIIIIIIIUIItl - railways 
Sources: l. Personal communications from Noord-Wes 
Kooperasie, Suid-Wes Transvaal Kooperasie, 
Koster Kooperasie, dated 2nd June 1982, lOth 
May 1982, and 4th May 1982 respectively. 
2. Bureau for Economic Research re Ba-ntu Develop-
ment (BENBO): "Bophuthatswana Economic 
Revue 1975", Pretoria, 1975, map between 
pp. 34, 35. 
3. RSA, Department of Community Development, 
Chief Director of Surveys and Mapping: 
1:250 000 Topocadastral Maps 2524, 2624, 2724, 
2526, 2626, 2726, Cape Town, 1980. 
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could be shown that capital was relatively easily and cheaply 
available, this would be an encouragement to build silos. 
Similarly, if it could be shown that labour of an acceptable 
quality and at an acceptable price became more difficult to 
obtain, this would have the same effect. 
that both occurred. 
There is evidence 
First, the State made loans for the construction of silos 
available at subsidized interest rates. 56 And second, 
many farmers expressed the opinion that men who were 
essential for the heavy work of handling sacks were 
usually poor seasonal workers, and more still spoke of the 
increasing difficulties and uncertainties of recruiting 
seasonal workers from Bophuthatswana, Botswana and Transkei. 
57 The reasons for this are discussed in chapter 6. Most 
seasonal workers were drawn from these sources until well 
into the '70s, by which stage nearly all farmers were 
delivering in bulk. 
While the building of silos relieved the problem of 
recruiting men, it did not on its own do away with the 
need to hire teams from Bophuthatswana, Botswana, and the 
Transkei 58 because the smallest team called for by hand-
harvesting was still larger than most farmers could hope 
recruit locally, i.e. from the families of permanent 
workers on their own and neighbouring farms. The simul-
taneous peak of most farmers' seasonal labour requirements 
during the harvesting season limited the scope for hiring 
workers from farms other than one's own. However, the 
combination of mechanical harvesting and bulk-handling 
resolved the problem. Gleaning behind combines needed 
not only no men, but also much smaller seasonal teams. 
These could indeed be raised from the families of permanent 
workers, who were much less likely to be volatile and 
uncontrollable. 
So it is no overstatement to suggest that the introduction 
of bulk handling and storage techniques was the key that 
opened the way to the fundamental changes in employment 
patterns that accompanied harvest mechanization in the '70s. 
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The adoption of mechanical harvesting alone could not have 
achieved this. An appreciation of the potential created 
by silos for replacing large teams from 'external' sources 
(including men), with smaller teams from 'internal' sources 
(not necessarily including men) must have been a powerful 
additional reason for building silos. 
Finally, two brief suggestions about the timing of the 
construction of bulk facilities: firstly, it was the boom 
of the '60s rather than the rise in mine wages and the new 
policy of the mines to recruit more South Africans that 
would have put pressure on the supply of able-bodied men 
willing to do seasonal farm work. 59 By the time changes 
in the mine labour market occurred, the silo-building 
programme was well advanced. And secondly, bulk handling 
and storage technology itself seems to have changed signifi-
cantly in the mid-'60s: the first silos were all built on 
the 'horizontal' principle, but since about 1965 all except 
the smallest have been built in the familiar cylindrical 
60 shape. This development may also account in part for 
the timing of the spread of silos. 
3.1.3 Weeding 
Having planted, the dryland farmer must simply wait for the 
main ingredient of success rain. But there are two 
important ways, independent of nature, in which he may 
encourage the growth of his crop: fertilizing and weedin~ 
Both can be done mechanically while the plants are still 
small enough to use a tractor without causing damage, but 
this is possible later only if the rows have been planted 
7 f h . h . '11 1 . 61 eet or more apart w 1c 1s st1 a popu ar pract1ce. 
For weeding, the procedure is simply to uproot the unwanted 
growth by ploughing lightly. Early weeding has for many 
years been done in this way. 
Later weeding on farms where the row width is less than 
7 feet, has until recently, had to be done by hand. Hoes 
must surely be the most ancient of agricultural implements 
still in use today in an unchanged form. And for a good 
) 
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reason they are very effective. But they are also great 
consumers of labour-hours, and there lies the rub. If one 
wants to economize on the use of labour, then other methods 
have to be devised. This is where chemicals come in. 
Spraying weedicides offers a labour-saving alternative to 
traditional half-hand, half-mechanical method. 
3.1.3.1 Hand/mechanical weeding 
In terms of capital equipment, a tractor and ploughing 
implement and a set of hoes are all that is necessary. 
To put these to use, one needs a driver and a team of 
workers. 
Hand-weeding teams are usually smaller than hand-
harvesting teams and include fewer men, the work being 
lighter and less urgent. This makes it easier to recruit 
them from the families of permanent farm workers. Local 
recruitment is assisted by the fact that weeding is often 
not carried on simultaneously on adjacent farms, as is the 
case with harvesting. Often, 62 because of the slackness 
of farming operations in mid-summer, farmers do not hire 
seasonal workers at· all, preferting to use permanent workers 
who would otherwise be inactive. 
3.1.3.2 Spraying 
Weedicides are usually sprayed onto the soil during, or 
shortly after planting by a tractor towing or mounted 
with a tank and spraying equipment. 
67 
Though it saves labour 63 , spraying has several disadvantages. 
It is not effective against all weeds in particular, 
Khaki bush, castor-oil bush, wild oats and several grasses 
are impervious to the chemicals used on maize. In addition~ 
for some types ofweed-killer to become active, rain is 
required within a week or two of spraying. Needless to 
say, this does not always happen. Not only this, if weed-
killers ar~ not mixed and applied correctly they may either 
not work at all; or may poison the ground killing the 
crop as well. In fact, one of the longer term problems 
created by many sprays is that they make the ground 
unsuitable for most other crops for two or three years 
after their application. Farmers become locked into 
existing crop patterns. Finally, because weedicides need 
to be used so early in the growth cycle, they may turn out 
to have been wasted if the crop is a failure. 
The labour required for spraying is one or more tractor 
drivers and spray operators, and, in most instances, a 
small team of hand-ho~s to deal with spray-resistant 
weeds. Most such teams are drawn from the families of 
permanent workers or even consist only of permanent 
workers. The capital goods needed are one or more 
tractors and sets of spraying equipment, and the chemicals 
themselves. 
3.1.3.3 The incidence of change in weeding techniques 
Table 13 and Figure 8 record the change in weeding 
techniques in terms of the percentage of farming units 
using each basic technique, or a combination of them, 
while Table 14 and Figure 9 do so in terms of the estimated 
percentage of the surface area weeded. 
Only a small minority of farmers were using chemical weed-
killers in 1968. Both mechanical harvesting and bulk 
handling and storage were considerably more advanced at 
that stage. The spread of the use of chemicals proceeded 
comparatively slowly at first, though it accelerated 
considerably between 1973 and 1977, and continued to grow 
at much the same rate until 1981. 
The lower starting percentage and the slower initial rate 
of growth of spraying explain why the 'cross-over' year 
was rather later for weeding (1978) than for harvesting 
(1974) and delivery (1969). The transition was not 
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than 20 percent of farmers were still using either hand and 
mechanical methods only or in combination with spraying. 
The estimates in Table 14 are based ~n the assumption that 
all crops not just maize are sprayed and/or weeded 
by hand each year. 64 
If Table 13 and Table 14 are compared, it is noticeable 
65 that the percentage of the arable area on which chemical 
weed-killers were used, always significantly exceeded the 
percentage of farming units on which sprays were used. The 
implication is that the new labour-saving technique was 
generally adopted more quickly on large farms than on 
smaller farms. 66 This is consistent with the trends shown 
in the diffusion of combine-harvesting, and bulk handling 
and storage. It also suggests that in each instance, 
economies of scale were inherent in the newer technique. 
71 
This in turn, offers a partial explanation for the continuous 
increase in the average size of farming units described below.67 
Why was spraying substituted for hand-hoeing? And why did 
the change occur when it did? Farmers were not questioned 
explicitly on the reasons for their choice of weeding 
technique so there is little evidence from this source. 
But several of the factors which seem most likely to have 
caused farmers to change their harvesting and delivery 
techniques probably operated in the case of weeding too, 
i.e. the relative cheapness, easiness, and effectiveness of 
the newer technique. To this one can add the easy avail-
ability of capital, problems in obtaining and managing 
seasonal labour, and economies of scale. 
However, while most of these factors probably played a part, 
they do not appear to have been as cogent, as in the case 
of the other two operations. The saving of labour was 
smaller; the newer process was not very much simpler since 
teams of workers were still used to supplement spraying in 
most instances; and there were severql technical and other 
difficulties inherent in the use of weed-killers, which 
limited their effectiveness. Also, hand-hoeing teams were 
generally smaller than hand-harvesting and delivery teams, 
seldom included men, and were drawn mostly from the families 
of permanent farm workers or even consisted of permanent 
68 workers themselves. So it seems unlikely that scarcity 
of labour was a major influence, or that mechanization of 
harvesting and delivery created a strong incentive to change 
to weedicides in the way that the introduction of silos 
encouraged the purchase of combines. 
For many farmers, the most important factor may have been 
a change in cultivation techniques. Deep ploughing appears 
to have given way to minimum tillage in many areas, the 
object of which is to conserve moisture and fuel. Even 
light ploughing to remove weeds increases tillage, so the 
use of weedicides fits in well with this policy. However, 
. . '11 . b . 1 69 m1n1mum t1 age 1s y no means un1versa . 
Without further investigation, the timing of the transition 
to spraying is difficult to explain. Because the capital 
72 
investment in spraying equipment is smaller than that 
called for by combine harvesting, the potential economies 
of scale accompanying the accelerated increase in the 
size of farms after 1973 would also have been smaller. A 
more likely factor is the sharp increase in the fuel price 
which also occurred after 1973. A considerable saving of 
fuel is generated by eliminating the ploughing up of 
d 70 h. . t d h . 1 . . wee s. T 1s po1n s towar s c anges 1n cu t1vat1ng 
techniques as a further possible explanation, though the 
date of introduction and rate of diffusion of these changes 
are unknown. Finally, it is also possible that a signifi-
cant improvement in chemical technology, giving weedicides 
a clear competitive advantage, occurred in the early '70s. 
The nature, timing and extent of changes in technology 
have been adequately described: as the second major factor 
influencing employment, the same now needs to be done for 
the size of farms. 
3.2 CHANGES IN THE SURFACE AREA OF FARMING UNITS 
73 
Recording the increase in farm size is important not only to 
gauge the extent to which larger farms may have been respon-
sible for changes in employment patterns through economies 
of scale, but also to establish a constant yardstick against 
which to measure such changes. The simplest way of 
measuring the change in the size of farms is to calculate the 
71 average surface area. Table 15 and Figure 10 set out the 
results. 
TABLE 15: The Average Gross Surface Area of Farming Units 
(in Hectares) 
Group 1968 19 73 1977 1981 
A 664 760 1257 1389 
B 709 10 74 1267 
c 1033 1172 
D 1155 
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The general trend is clear: between 1968 and 1981 there was 
a consistent and very substantial growth in the average size 
of farming units. For the largest group in each year 
(illustrated in Figure 10), the overall increase was more 
than 70 percent, while for group A, which made up more than 
half of the total, the increase was more than 100 percent. 
Nor was this expansion confined to a small proportion of 
progressive farmers. Of the farms for which sufficient 
data was recorded for 1968, no fewer than 50 percent had 
increased in size pre-1968; 35 percent did likewise between 
1968 and 1973; between 1973 and 1977 the percentage was 53; 
and during the four years before 1981 about 27 percent of 
61 units expanded. During the entire period, only 6 
decreases were recorded. So the tendency to expand was 
indeed widespread. 
The most rapid period of growth occurred between 1973 and 
1977 when the average increase was about 45 percent, or 
between 10 and ll percent annually (for the largest group). 
There is also a clear correlation between farm size and 
duration of ownership. 72 The longer established farmers 
tended to own the largest farms, which is what one would 
expect. 
What were the causes of the growth in farm size? And 
what were the implications? The causes appear more complex 
than can be dealt with adequately at this point, and are 
often difficult to distinguish from the consequences. A 
range of factors such as the phase of the business cycle, 
the availability of credit, the profitability of maize 
farming, speculation and simply irrational desire probably 
played a part. Only factors affecting the relationship 
between employment patterns and farm size are considered. 
Some clues as to what was cause and what was effect are to 
be found in the relative turning of developments. Figure 
11 draws together the data for harvesting, delivery and 
weeding, and shows the diffusion of the more capital 
intensive techniques. It is not possible to show the 
growth in the size of farming units on the same graph 73 , 
but a comparison of Figures 10 and 11 gives a rough idea 
of the order of events. 
By 1973, when the most rapid expansion in farm size began, 
only delivery in bulk had reached an advanced stage. While 
it is implausible to suggest that this was the main cause 
of the sudden spate of land purchases, it can nevertheless 
be seen as a contributory factor. The reasons are as 
follows: constraints on the availability, quality and 
management of seasonal labour have always been important 
determinants of the maximum size of farms. It makes little 
sense to plant a record acreage if, when it ripens, one 
cannot muster the manpower to harvest it. 
76 
As we have already seen, the introduction of bulk handling 
and storage facilities made it possible to harvest and 
deliver crops with a smaller seasonal team, and one · not 
necessarily including men. This significantly loosened the 
labour constraint, and certainly made the purchase of hiring 
of additional land a more manageable proposition, even if it 
did not actually induce it. Furthermore, to the extent 
that bulk delivery and storage systems involved farmers both 
individually and collectively in the investment of larger 
amounts of fixed capital 74 , economies of scale would 
probably have been p~esent and would have added to the 
attractions of enlarging one's farm. 
In their evidence, no farmers reported having bought or 
hired additional land as a direct consequence of using a 
combine-harvester. Quite often, the addition of land in 
fact, preceded the purchase of a combine. Nevertheless, 
combines coupled with silos should be seen as an important -
indeed a critical - factor facilitating land purchase. 
Without them, the expansion of farming units on the scale 
that occurred would have been almost impossible. 
Regrettably, farmers were not questioned in detail about 
their reasons for purchasing or hiring more land. 
What are more important here are the implications of larger 
land holdings, particularly for employment. Again, when 
questioned, few farmers said that they had mechanized 
harvesting as a direct result of acquiring more land. But 
this may have been a matter of perception or perhaps a 
result of the way in which the question was asked 
because other evidence indicates the contrary. Bearing in 
mind the frequent and wide-ranging complaints that farmers 
made about seasonal workers from Black rural areas, 
especially Bophuthatswana, it is unlikely that they would 
have wanted to enlarge their farms so substantially if they 
had been obliged to increase their recruitment of such 
workers proportionately. 
This argument is supported by the number of cases in which 
an increase in farm size was either accompanied in the same 
year or followed a year later by the purchase of one or 
more combines. This occurred in 18 of the 76 recorded 
instances of the addition of land, i.e. an incidence of 23 
75 percent. At first sight the correlation does not appear 
77 
to be strong, but it should be appreciated that most farmers 
added to their land-holdings bit by bit rather than in one 
large transaction, and that having once bought mechanical 
harvesting equipment they would generally have had some 
capacity to spare. 
The connection between larger farms and more capital-
intensive harvesting techniques is established beyond doubt 
when calculations are made of the relative cost-efficiency 
of hand and mechanical harvesting. Only for much smaller-
than-average harvest areas and/or for much lower-than-
average yields per hectare is hand harvesting more cost-
ff 0 0 76 ( S F 0 52 55 d A d ° C b 1 ) e 1c1ent. - ee 1gures - an ppen 1x e ow . 
Farmers who were questioned about employment on additional 
land purchased said that, in general, they did retain the 
permanent workers who had been employed by the previous 
owner, and preferred to 'rationalize' the use of their 
own workers. Some of the dismissed workers subsequently 
found work on other farms, but many did not and were 
obliged to move with their families, mostly into Bophuthat-
swana. The effect of the consolidation of farms and the 
consequent retrenchment on permanent employment is dis-
cussed in more detail in sections 4. 2 and 4. 4 below. 
Between 1968 and 1981 both the proportion of farm land 
cultivated and the proportion (of the total) planted with 
. 77 d d . 11 f . th ma1ze , ecrease marg1na y on arms 1n e survey, 
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though whether this was connected with the growth of indivi-
dual farming units is uncertain. The average proportion of 
arable land fell from about 0, 78 in 1968 to about 0, 71 in~ 
1981, the corresponding figures for maize being 0.69 and 
0.65. 78 These trends reflect a slight shift away from 
arable and towards pastoral farming, and, within arable 
farming, a slight increase in the degree of specialization 
in maize production. 79 Though pastoral farming is 
probably less labour-intensive, but offers proportionately 
more job opportunities to workers without mechanical skills, 
the influence of these changes on the level and nature of 
employment is probably too small to be noticeable. 
For the Western Transvaal as a whole, data collected by the 
Maize Board indicates that the area planted with maize 
increased marginally. The average area planted with maize 
during the first half of the period (1968- 1974) was 
1 128 000 ha, while during the second half (1975 -1981) it 
80 was 1 182 000 ha , which represents a 4,8 percent increase. 
Data for the total area of farms is not available after 
1976 81 , so it is not clear whether this increase was the 
result of an increase in the total farming area or whether 
it took place at the expense of other crops or pastoral 
production. Whatever the case, the influence on the level 
and nature of employment is again probably too small to be 
noticeable. 
Another implication of the growth in the size of farming 
units is an increase in the concentration of control. 
Since the total area of farms in the Western Transvaal 
'j 9 
appears to have remained fairly constant between 1968 and 
1976 82 the last year for which census data is available -
the enlargement of some farming units must have entailed the 
reduction or total disappearance of others, which in turn 
means a growing degree of concentration of control. The 
same is not necessarily true of ownership because land can 
of course be rented out rather than sold. 
Lastly, an observation about what is really a quite 
astonishing rise in the average size of farms: one cannot 
help wondering whether for many farmers it does not represent 
an over-investment in land relative to other productive 
83 assets. Even in the middle '70s this was being suggested , 
and by the early '80s farming units were still larger. With 
the decline in the profitability of maize farming since the 
middle '70s 84 farmers start placing emphasis I may more on 
better use of the land that they already have. If so, the 
growth in the average size of farming units may, at least 
for the present, have come to a halt, with all that that implies 
for employment. 
3.3 CHANGES IN THE YIELD PER HECTARE 
The third important influence on employment is the tonnage 
of maize produced per hectare, or the 'yield'. Ideally, 
one would want to record the tonnage produced against the 
area planted by each farmer in each year. 
detailed information was not collected. 
However, such 
The actual yields 
shown in the centre column of Table 16 were calculated by 
the Department of Agriculture for a region coinciding 
roughly with that covered by the survey. 85 
In addition to the actual yields, a series of expected 
yields has been calculated on the basis of the least squares 
linear regression equation: 
y' = 1311,1 + 131,2x 
where x = the year 
and y = the expected yield. 
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4335 3148 
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Sources: (a) R.S.A., Department of Agriculture, Division 
of Agricultural Marketing Research: Abstract 
of Agricultural Statistics 1983 etc., Table 9, 
page 9. 
(b) Own estimates (see previous page). 
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Both series are graphed in Figure 12. The expected values 
are useful for two purposes: they make it easier to 
discern the overall trend, and they offer a less volatile 
basis for estimating employment on a constant output scale, 
86 e.g. number of workers per l 000 tonnes harvested. 
The most noticeable features of Figure 12 are the sharp 
fluctuations in actual yield between 1972 and 1976, the 
extraordinary crop of 1981, and the marked upward trend of 
the expected yield. The two 'lows' in 1972 and 1976 were 
caused respectively by drought and floods. Conversely, to 
have reached the spectuacular 'high' in 1981, weather 
conditions throughout the region must have been near-ideal. 
But of more importance for economic analysis, is the overall 
upward trend: the co-efficient of x in the regression 
equation indicates that, on average, output grew by about 
130 kilograms per hectare, or at compound rate of about 
6,2 percent each year. 
The causes of this trend can be divided into two broad 
groups: more inputs, and more productive inputs. If 
more inputs were used per hectare, they certainly did not 
include more labour: quite the reverse as later analysis 
shows. More than likely, they involved a greater input 
of capital per hectare in the form of machinery, fertilizer, 
pesticides, chemical week-killers, etc. 
It is also likely that most of the capital inputs become 
more productive: the development and continuous improve-
ment of seed hybrids is an obvious example. Table 60 
and Figure 48 suggest that there was also a slight growth 
in the 'average skill level' of permanent workers. 87 
It can be assumed that favourable weather conditions 
played a part in raising yields as well. 
The most direct way in which a rise or fall in the yield 
82 
influences employment is in the number of seasonal workers 
taken on to harvest or glean and deliver the crop. 
A month or two before harvesting is due to begin,, farmers 
inspect their fields 
workers' foreman 
the seasonal team. 
sometimes with the seasonal 
to decide on the optimal strength of 
The better the yield, the bigger the 
83 
team. The number of permanent workers assigned to harvesting 
and delivery also depends on the yield. 
Because harvesting activities require more labour than any 
others, one would expect the upward trend in output to have 
led to an increase in the number of workers, both seasonal 
and permanent. In practice, mechanization has resulted in 
quite the opposite, as Chapter 4 shows. Of course, by 
adding to output per farming unit, the rise in yields, no 
less than the increase in farm size, has opened the way to 
the realization of economies of scale by mechanization. 
There is a sense in which the reverse has also taken 
place; that is, harvest mechanization has led to an increase 
in yields. For many farmers one of the most important 
reasons for buying combine-harvesters was to take the crop 
ff h 1 d . kl 
88 d f h . o t e an more qu1c y. An one o t e most lmpor-
tant reasons for doing this was to be able to plough 
earlier after harvesting so as to increase the soil's 
capacity to retain moisture, which, in turn, has a benefi-
cial effect on the following season's crop. So the 
direction of causation has not been entirely from higher 
yields to harvest mechanization. Nevertheless, it was the 
changes in biological , chemical and other technology 
which raised yields and thereby encouraged harvest mechani-
zation, that were most significant. 
On the other hand, for most farmers the change to silos 
and combines took place before the change to weed-killing 
sprays. It would therefore be incorrect to regard the 
improvement in yields brought about by sprays as having 
contributed appreciably to the decision to mechanize 
harvesting and delivery: only about 8 percent of farmers 
who purchased combines began using chemical weed-killers 
beforehand. The connection between these two forms of 
technological change is weak. 89 
It has been shown how changes in technology, in farm size, and 
in yield occurred in the Western Transvaal between 1968 and 
1981. It has also been shown how, both individually and 
jointly, these changes may influence the level and nature 
of employment. What is needed now is to quantify the 
effects of the various forms of technological change on 




31. One of the obvious criticisms is that, if it requires an 







the rate of profit~is indeterminate, andwill depend on 
the relative magnitude of the increases in c/v and s/v. 
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Marx argued that s/v would rise faster than c/v at first, 
but that beyond some point the position would be reversed 
(see Howard and King: op.cit., p.204). Hence the tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall in the long run in capitalist 
economies. Needless to say, this is the subject of much 
debate. Howard and King discuss this and other criticisms 
in some detail (ibid., pp.l98-199, 203 ff, 231).-
32. See Section 6.3.3, esp. pp.223-226 below. 
33. See Salter: op.cit., pp.35-38. 
34. Rosenberg, N.: "Marx as a Student of Technology", in 
Levidow, L. and R.M. Young: "Science, Technology and the 
Labour Process: Marxist Studies", vol. 1, CSE Books, 
London, 1981, p.l6. 
35. Braverman, H.: "Labor and Monopoly Capital", Monthly 
Review Press, New York, 1974, p.l95. 
36. See, e.g., Heilbroner: op.cit., pp.l09-110, 112-113. 
37. Even at this level, maximization of the rate of unemploy-
ment is hardly likely to be an unqualified goal, both for 
'security's' sake and because of the need for consumer 
demand to realize profits. 
38. See Section 4.1.1, p.90 above. 
39. From Chapter 4, notes 19 and 20, it can be calculated that 
between 1968 and 1977, about 52 percent of the labour 
saved in harvesting and delivering 100 standard 9-ton loads 
of maize was attributable to the change from hand- to 
mechanical-harvesting. About 38 percent was due to the 
re-organization of hand-harvesting, about 9 percent to 
the introduction of bulk methods of delivery, and less 
than 1 percent to the change from PTO to SP combines. 
(Between 1977 and 1981, total employment for these operations 
changed little.) When weeding is taken into account, 
these percentages becomes 39, 28, 7 and less than 1 of 
the total reduction in seasonal employment respectively, 
the change of weeding technique making up the balance (26 
percent). 
40. See, e.g., Figure 11 above. 
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41. Metcalf: op.cit., p.69. (The article discussed by Metcalf 
is Griliches, Z.: "Hybrid corn: an exploration in the 
economics of technical change", Econometrica, Vol. 25 (4), 
October 1957, pp.SOl-522.) 
42. i.e. combine-harvesters, bulk delivery systems and chemical 
weed sprays. 
43. Perusal of the annual reports of Massey-Ferguson and Malco-
mess, two of the largest combine-harvester suppliers in 
South Africa, revealed the following: 
(a) There was a delay in fulfilling sales orders for 
Massey-Ferguson's range of SP combines in 1974 and 
1975. According to the company, this was caused 
by a combination of circumstances: two excellent 
agricultural seasons during which the deman~ for har-
vesting equipment boomed, and difficulties in obtain-
ing supplies from overseas manufacturers. 
(b) Massey-Ferguson's subsidiary, Slattery - the domi-
nant local manufacture~ of PTO combines - reported 
a similar sales backlog in the same years. 
(c) Malcomess also experienced these conditions in 1974 
and 1975, but noted that despite overseas supply delays 
harvesting equipment had been marketed on time - as 
in all other years between 1970 and 1976. 
It is possible that any sales lost by these two firms were 
gained by competitors, so the true extent of the supply 
constraint is hard to assess. 
Sources 
Massey-Ferguso~ (South Africa) Limited: Annual Reports, 
1969-1975, esp. 1974, pp.5,9; 1975, pp.8,9; 
Malcomess Limited: Annual Reports, 1970-1976, esp. 1974, 
p.4; 1975, p.lS. 
44. See Section 2.1.1, p.l4 above. 
45. For example, if a farmer rates 'labour unavailability' 
as the most important, •quickness• (of combine-harvesting) 
second, and 'cheapness' (of combine-harvesting) third, 
these would have been given 3, 2 and l points respectively. 
All points for each 'reason' were added up and averaged. 
46. The 53 percent for 'labour unavailable' given in Table 
61 is probably an under-estimate: several of the answers 
categorized in the analysis as 'sundry• could have had 
the same meaning. (Where farmers had not mechanized har-
vesting - in two instances - this data could not be 
collected.) 
47. It was not always clear what farmers meant by this, though 
they were probably referring to the elimination of the 
need for men to handle 90 kg sacks, and hence to the 
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41. Metcalf: op.cit., p.69. (The article discussed by Metcalf 
is Griliches, Z.: "Hybrid corn: an exploration in the 
economics of technical change", Econometrica, Vol. 25 (4), 
October 1957, pp.SOl-522.) 
42. i.e. combine-harvesters, bulk delivery systems and chemical 
weed sprays. 
43. Perusal of the annual reports of Massey-Ferguson and Malco-
mess, two of the largest combine-harvester suppliers in 
South Africa, revealed the following: 
(a) There was a delay in fulfilling sales orders for 
Massey-Ferguson's range of SP combines in 1974 and 
1975. According to the company, this was caused 
by a combination of circumstances: two excellent 
agricultural seasons during which the deman~ for har-
vesting equipment boomed, and difficulties in obtain-
ing supplies from overseas manufacturers. 
(b) Massey-Ferguson's subsidiary, Slattery - the domi-
nant local manufacture~ of PTO combines - reported 
a similar sales backlog in the same years. 
(c) Malcomess also experienced these conditions in 1974 
and 1975, but noted that despite overseas supply delays 
harvesting equipment had been marketed on time - as 
in all other years between 1970 and 1976. 
It is possible that any sales lost by these two firms were 
gained by competitors, so the true extent of the supply 
constraint is hard to assess. 
Sources 
Massey-Ferguson (South Africa) Limited: Annual Reports, 
1969-1975, esp. 1974, pp.5,9; 1975, pp.8,9; 
Malcomess Limited: Annual Reports, 1970-1976, esp. 1974, 
p.4; 1975, p.l5. 
44. See Section 2.1.1, p.l4 above. 
45. For example, if a farmer rates 'labour unavailability• 
as the most important, 'quickness• (of combine-harvesting) 
second, and 'cheapness• (of combine-harvesting) third, 
these would have been given 3, 2 and 1 points respectively. 
All points for each 'reason' were added up and averaged. 
46. The 53 percent for 'labour unavailable' given in Table 
61 is probably an under-estimate: several of the answers 
categorized in the analysis as 'sundry• could have had 
the same meaning. (Where farmers had not mechanized har-
vesting - in two instances - this data could not be 
collected.) 
47. It was not always clear what farmers meant by this, though 
they were probably referring to the elimination of the 
need for men to handle 90 kg sacks, and hence to the 
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possibility of replacing larger 'external' teams consisting 
partly of men by smaller 'internal' teams which included 
few, if any, men. (See Section 3.1.2.3, p.57 above.) 
None of the directed-response questions concerned bulk 
delivery, as its potential importance was not appreciated 
until after the survey had started. The answers involving 
this factor were given when farmers were asked to identify 
the three most important factors in their decision to mecha-
nize. If an explicit, directed-response question had 
been asked about this, it might have emerged as more 
important. 
48. Again, some of the 'sundry• answers could have fitted into 
the 'combine harvesting quicker• category. Fifty-three 
percent could be an underestimate. 
49. Metcalf: op.cit., pp.40-41. 
50. Sources (of Table 62): 
Wal : Table 25 above. 
Wil' Wi 2 : R.S.A. Department of Statistics: South African Statistics 1974, etc., pp.7.6, 7.7, 7.38, 7.39; 
1 9 8 2 I pp o 7 o 6 I 8 o 1 9 o 
R.S.A. Department of Statistics: Statistics of 
Houses and Domestic Servants, October 1973 and of 
Flats, May 1973 (ll-03-09), Table All.l, pp.l0-12; 
ibid., 1980 (11-03-16), Table All.l, pp.l0-12; 
R.S.A. Department of Statistics: South African Sta-
tistics 1982, etc., p.8.24. The estimates for 
1968-1977 are the unweighted arithmetic means of 
the average monthly wage in cash only of full-time 
black female 'general' domestic servants in 'all 
houses' in the urban areas Witwatersrand, Pretoria, 
Vaal Triangle, Bloemfontein, OFS goldfields and Kim-
berley. For 1978-1980, Klerksdorp is included as 
well. For 1981, the estimate was based on the in-
crease between 1980 and 1981 of the •weighted average 
index of cash wages of full-time domestic servants' 
(see South African Statistics, 1982, etc .loc.cit.) The 
•cash only' figure was chosen so as to make the wage 
comparable with the wages of other groups of workers 
in the table, including seasonal farm workers, which 
were also calculated on a •cash only' basis. 
R.S.A. Department of Statistics: South African Sta-
tistics 1974, etc., pp.7.12, 7.43; 1980, p.7.7; 
1982, p.7.7. 
51. Sources (of Table 63): 
wa2 : Table 26 above. 
wil' wi 2 : as in note 50. 
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as in note 50, but calculated on an 'all-inclusive• 
basis so as to be comparable with wages of permanent 
farm workers. Strictly speaking, this makes the 
basis of comparison with mining, manufacturing and 
construction wages - all calculated as •cash only' 
-unequal. In practice this makes little difference~ 
because domestic wages are so much lower than these 
three. The comparison with permanent farm wages 
is more important. 
52. For a full discussion of why the wages of black mine workers 
rose in the first half of the 1970s, see Wilson, F.: 
"Current Labour Issues in South Africa", in Price, R.M. 
and e.G. Rosberg: "The Apartheid Regime", Institute of 
International Studies, University of California, Berkley, 
1980, pp.l54-159. 
53. The premises of this assumption are: most farm workers 
have relatively few industrial skills; almost all mining 
workers come from rural areas; since the early '70s the 
mining industry has attempted to recruit a greater propor-
tion of its workers from within South Africa; influx control 
makes the search for other industrial jobs difficult. 
54. "(TEBA) has a dozen offices in and around Bophuthatswana 
and recruited 33 161 mine labourers in 1976 as against 
only 6 392 in 1970". (Buro vir Ekonomiese Navorsing insake 
Bantoe Ontwikkeling (BENBO): op.cit. (1977), p.Sl). 
55. "This increase (described in note 54) was mainly due to 
an intensive recruiting campaign and better salaries and 
working conditions at the mines" (ibid.). This change 
of policy is well documented. See also, e.g., Knight, 
J.B.: "Is South African running out of unskilled labour?", 
in Wilson, Kooy and Hendrie: op.cit., p.44. 
56. See concluding paragraph of Section 6.3.2.1, p.214 and 
note 69 below. 
57. See Table 65 and Figure 57 below. 
58. See Table 16 and Figure 12 above. This assumes the trend 
in 'black' yields to be similar to the trend in 'white' 
yields. The relative output levels do not matter. 
59. See Chapter 1, note 1 above. 
60. These estimates are open to criticism too (see Section 
7.2.2.2, pp.251-253 below), but are still helpful in a 
number nf respects, e.g. in giving a breakdown by race, 
sex and region, and are a great improvement on the previous 
near-complete absence of data. 
61. Vander Merwe, P.J.: "Black Employment Problems in South 
Africa", Finance and Trade Review, Volkskas, Pretoria, 
Vol. XII (2), December 1976, Table 8, p.73. 
62. Ibid. Vander Merwe's estimates differ most from Simkins' 
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in respect of their starting point. Whereas van der Merwe 
puts black unemployment on white farms at 1,7 percent in 
1970, Simkins estimates it to have been about 20 percent 
throughout the •60s. (See Simkins, C.E.W.: 11 African 
Population, Employment and Incomes on Farms outside the 
Reserves, 1923-1969 11 , unpublished paper, University of 
Cape Town, 1981, pp.7,8). 
63. School attendance figures by no means tell all, but they 
are the most accessible indicator of the level of formal 
education. Between the 1970 and 1980 censuses there was 
a 73 percent increase in the number of black pupils at 
lower primary schools in white rural areas, a 170 percent 
increase in the number at higher primary schools, and a 
300 percent increase in the number at secondary schools. 
(Sources: R.S.A. Department of Statistics: Population 
Census, 1970, Bantu - Age, Occupation, Industry, School 
Standard, Birthplace (02-02-02), Table 2, p.ll; ·ibid., 
1980 Social Characteristics (02-08-02), Table 12, p.366). 
Different methods of compilation make it difficult to com-
pare school attendance in black rural areas. 
For evidence of the increase in the number of farms schools 
and school attendance between 1959 and 1972, and some criti-
cal reflection, see Plaut, T.: 11 Farm Schools for African 
and Coloured Children in South Africa 11 , SALDRU Farm Labour 
Conference Paper No. 17, University of Cape Town, 1976. 
(About 25 percent of black children between the ages of 
5 and 14 in the Bloemhof, Christiana, Coligny, Delarey-
ville, Koster, Lichtenburg, Schweizer-Reneke, Ventersdorp 
and Wolmaransstad magisterial districts were estimated 
to have attended school in 1972 - ibid., Table 12, p.22). 
64. Some farmers said that many young black workers were 
less prepared to submit to the authority of a foreman 
nowadays because they felt they were better educated than 
him. This had led to a deterioration in the performance 
of seasonal teams. 
65. See Section 5.1.3.5 above. 
66. One of the functions of these boards and their predecessors, 
the Labour Tenancy Control Boards, was to regulate the 
number of black workers on farms. (See Morris, M.: 
11 State intervention and the agricultural labour supply 
post-1948 11 , in Wilson, Kooy and Hendrie: op.cit., p.70). 
67. See Section 5.1.3.1, esp. p.l43 above. 
68. See Surplus Peoples Project: op.cit. The only localities 
in which this appears to have happened (on a small scale) 
are Vermaas and Migdol (see Figure 7 above). 
69. Apart from their physical disqualification from employment 
in mining and construction (see note 56 above), many women 
are eithe~ not familiar with the domestic appliances found 
in most white homes or are not sufficiently fluent in 
English or Afrikaans to communicate adequately with poten-
tial employers. (This effectively disqualifies them from 
domestic services too.) 
70. The Current Population Survey records that in November 
1980 and November 1981, the urban unemployment rate for 
black males was 6,3 and 7,0 percent respectively, while 
the comparative rates for black females were 1~,9 and 
12,2 percent respectively. (See R.S.A. Department of 
Statistics: Statistical News Release, P27.3, 14 May 1981; 
24 June 1982.) 
71. Sources (of Table 64): 
Wal Table 25 above 
Table 26 above 
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R.S.A. Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Division of Agricultural Marketing Research: Abstract 
of Agricultural Statistics 1982, etc., Tabl~ 101, p.l97 
(index for 'implements•) 
p 
a 
ibid., Table 7, p.7 (net producers• price of yellow 
maize) . 
72. Until 1979 the price recorded in the Abstract of Agricul-
tural Statistics was the same for both yellow and white 
maize. Thereafter the price for white maize was slightly 
the higher. Yellow maize was selected because its output 
in the Western Transvaal was slightly the greater. (See 
R.S.A. Maize Board: op.cit. (1981), Annexure V, p.l9). 
73. There is actually a range of prices depending on colour, 
grade and cleanness. The price used here is the net 
producers• price for yellow maize, best grades, uncleaned, 
including • distress payments •, • export profit payments •, 
etc., (see R.S.A. Maize Board: op.cit. (1981), Annexure 
XXIV I p. 38) . 
74. See Table 16 and Figure 12 above. 
75. i.e. a movement along the same isoquant, the production 
function remaining constant. In Metcalf's model of the 
labour market, the production function is assumed to 
remain constant, •technology• being an exogenously deter-
mined variable. 
76. Cogan, J.: "The Decline in Black Teenage Employment: 
1950-70", in American Economic Review, Vol. 72 (4), 
September 1982, p.627. (The additions in brackets are 
my own) . 
77. See, e.g., Tables 32 and 23A above. 
78. See Tables 25 and 26 above. 
79. See Section 6.3.2.1, p.213 above. 
80. A relative!~ small rightward shift of the demand curve 
(given a larger leftward movement of the supply curve) 
would also be consistent with a fall in the level of 
employment and a rise in the equilibrium wage rate. This 
possibility is not discussed because the data indicates 
that the demand curve did not move rightwards. 
81. See Table 55 and Figure 42 above. 
82. Although farmers were not asked explicitly about this, 
itw~ evident from the questionnaire that most questions 
concerned the work done by seasonal teams. Only one 
or two farmers referred specifically to a shortage of 
permanent labour, and it was generaliy clear when they 
were talking about permanent workers. 
83. See Table 10 and Figure 5 above. 
84. See Section 1 •r6 above. 
85. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether the comments 
referred to seasonal or permanent workers. 
86. See Table 16 and Figure 12 above. 
87. This assumes f.armers • comments about the reluctance of 
seasonal workers to take employment in years when their 
own crops are good, are correct. See Section 6.3.2.1, 
p.212 above. 
88. Perversely, 1976 is the first year in which real seasonal 
wages appear to have risen normally after 196 8! (See 
Table 25 and Figure . 22 above). 
89. See note 43,and Table 16 and Figure 12 above. 
90. For example, the expectation of a larger than average 
90 
income or profit may have encouraged the purchase of capital 
equipment. The Jacobs Committee reported that the average 
net income per RlOO of capital invested on farms in the 
summer grain area was Rl5,00 in 1974 and Rll,22 in 1975~ 
as against an average of Rl0,94 for the 5 years 1974-1978 
(inclusive). (R.S.A. Werkskomitee insake die Ekonomiese 
Posisie van die Boer etc.: op.cit., Table 7(a), p.48). 
91. Fisher, L.H.: "The Harvest Labor Market in California", 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1953, 
p .11. 
92. "To place the essential elements of the farmer's employment 
decisions in proper focus", Fisher makes three assumptions. 
"The first ... is that the harvest operation is a separate 
economic enterprise, and that decisions made relative 
to it are independent ... To be sure, ... decisions (con-
cerning the area to plant, etc.) have been guided by expec-
tations of yield, price and labor costs. These decisions 
once made, however, the harvest decisions become almost 
totally independent of them. 
"The second assumption is that the total harvest cost 
is~abor cost. This is in close accord with non-
mechanized operations. 
"The third assumption is that the labor employed is com-
pensated at piece rates" (ibid. p.lO). 
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On maize farms in the Western Transvaal prior to harvest 
mechanization, the first assumption was fully met. The 
second less fully: if harvesting is taken to include 
reaping and threshing, then both the transport of the 
'blaarkoppe' to the threshing machine and the threshing 
itself are mechanized. Only the latter requires machinery 
usable solely at harvest time. The third assumption 
was roughly half fulfilled (see note 93). 
93. An analysis of data for the Western Transvaal collected 
by the Department of Agriculture in its annual surveys, 
shows the following: 
TABLE 64A: Method of Payment of Seasonal Harvest Workers 
(Percentage of Farms) 
Year Daily Cash Proportion Total Wage of Crop 
1969 51 49 100 
1970 50 50 100 
1971 40 60 100 
1972 31 69 100 
1973 51 49 100 
1974 60 40 100 
1975 63 37 100 
1976 69 31 100 
The payment of a proportion of the crop - usually about 
5 percent for hand harvesting (see Chapter 4, note 57 
above) - is, in effect, piece rate payment, because the 
same proportion is paid regardless of the number of workers 
or days. A fixed daily cash wage is, of course, not 
a piece rate. On average, about 48 percent of farms 
between 1968 and 1976, paid a piece rate, but it is notice-
able that in the first four years, when hand-harvesting 
was more common, payment by this method was more popular. 
94. See Table 61 above. Note the high priority given to 
'combine harvesting quicker'. 
95. In this instance, one cannot easily use the argument that 
farm wages were temporarily above their equilibrium rate 
- causing a temporary excess of supply in the labour market 
-to explain unemployment. If this had been the case, 
one would expect farm wages to have fallen subsequently, 
whereas they rose in the case of permanent workers and 
remained more or less unchanged in the case of seasonals. 
On the other hand, at no stage did either wage ever rise 
significantly in relation to mining or manufacturing wages, 
though permanent wages did show an appreciable increase 
against construction and domestic workers• wages in the 
second half of the '70s. 
96. Strictly, blacks not employed on white farms have no right 
to remain in white rural areas. Unlike in 'prescribed' 
urban areas, blacks can never obtain the right, in terms 
of the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (No. 25 of 
1945), to reside permanently in •non-prescribed' white 
rural areas. Legal residence depends on employment, 
or more correctly, on farmers' permission which normally 
goes with employment. Without permission, residence 
amounts to trespass rather than contravention of influx 
control regulations. (See also chapter 5, note 152 above.) 
97. It is assumed that people with little income other than 
from wage employment cannot remain voluntarily unemployed 
for long. (See Section 6.3.2.1, esp. p.213above). 
98. Some farmers had owned combines since the middle 1950s. 
However, it is probable that the quality of combines im-
proved steadily from the time that they first appeared 
on the market. Most farmers felt that this had happened 
and said that it had influenced their decision to mechanize 
but was not amongst the most important factors. 
99. See Section 6.2.1, esp. p.l92-198 above. 
100. See van Wyk: op.cit. (1970), chapters VI, VII. See 
also Appendix C below. 
101. See Table 16 and Figure 12 above. 
102. See Tables 15 and 15B and Figure 10 above. 
103. See Section 3.2, esp. p. 77 above. 
104. The argument applies equally to rented land. 
105. This is the procedure adopted in standard American and 
British texts. (See, e.g., Hunt, D.: "Farm Power and 
Machinery Management" (6th ed.), Iowa State University 
Press, Ames, Iowa, 1973, Chapter 4; and Culpin, C.: 
"Profitable Farm Modernization" (3rd ed.), Crosby Lockwood, 
London, 1975, pp.53-57.) van Wyk, from whose work the 
method used in Appendix C was adopted, used this standard 
procedure. 
106. Caveat: no time limit for harvesting, e.g. 8 weeks, 
was assumed in calculating the values in Figures 52-55. 
For this reason PTO combine harvesting always appears 
cheaper than SP combine harvesting. In practice, beyond 
a certain tonnage, a second PTO combine would need to 
be purchased to complete harvesting within an acceptable 
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period. This would more or less double the cost of PTO 
combine harvesting. (Of course, the same is true of 
SP combines beyond a greater tonnage.) There are there-
fore discontinuities in the cost curves which are not 
shown in the diagrams. But this would not affect the 
decision to change from hand to mechanical harvesting. 
Figures 52-55 are adequate for the purpose for which they 
are used here. 
107. Data for 7 of the 61 farms was missing: estimates based 
on average values were used where this occurred, but even 
some incorrect assumptions based on these estimates would 
still have left the percentage of farms handling less 
than the critical tonnage small. 
108. See Appendix C below. 
109. If the price indices of farm implements, fuel and· labour 
had been 100 in 1970 (no data for permanent farm wages 
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is available before this), then by 198l,at current prices, 
farm implements would have risen to 349, fuel to 842, 
permanent labour to 790, and seasonal labour to 385. 
Relative to wages, the price of capital equipment fell, 
improving the competitive position of more capital-intensive 
techniques. Surprisingly, mechanical harvesting may 
also save fuel: whereas hand harvesting requires at least 
two tractors for reaping and threshing (one in the fields 
and one threshing), PTO combine harvesting requires only 
one tractor, though its fuel consumption may be greater 
than either of the two involved in hand harvesting. 
Both factors suggest that 'some movement (of prices) in 
favour of mechanical harvesting probably occurred'. 
(Index Sources: implements and fuel - R.S.A. Department 
of Agriculture, Division of Agricultural Marketing Research: 
op.cit. (1983), Table 100, p.l96 and Table 102, p. 108 
respectively; permanent and seasonal labour: Tables 
26 and 25 above respectively.) 
110. Assuming that the average yield per hectare was the expected 
yield (see Table 16 above), the minimum area required 
to make mechanical harvesting cheaper than manual, would 
have been roughly 185 ha in 1968, 135 ha in 1973, 105 
ha in 1977 and 80 ha in 1981. The expected yield is 
used in preference to the actual yield because, although 
the size of the crop on the land in the year in which 
a combine is purchased may influence a farmer's decision, 
purchases of durable capital inputs, such as combine-har-
vesters, are presumably also made in the expectation of 
crops of a certain size in years to come. Whichever 
yield is used, the percentage of farms falling below the 
critical hectarage is small. 
Writing in 1964, van Wyk calculated the critical area 
to be between 175 and 200 morgen (about 150 and 170 hec-
tares) . ( van Wyk I J .J.: "Wat is goedkoper - meganies 
of handoes?", in Boerdery in Suid Afrika, Vol. 40 (3), 
June 1964, p.35). So the estimates above do not look 
unrealistic and may even be conservative. 
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111. See Section 6.2.1, p.l99 above. 
112. Tractors and trailers, used for threshing and transport 
from field to threshing machine, have so many other uses 
on farms, especially at planting time, that it is unlikely 
that they would be sold on the phasing-out of hand har-
vesting. 
113. See Appendix C below. 
114. Changes in relative factor prices may have helped bring 
about the development of new maize harvesting techniques 
in the United States, but the transfer of those techniques 
to South Africa was scarcely a function of changes in 
relative factor prices locally. 
115. See Figures 52-55 above. 
116. R.S.A. Commission of Enquiry into Agriculture: op.cit. 
(1970), p.l65. 
117. See Table 61 above. The respective percentages in the 
table cannot simply be added because some farmers would 
have included both factors in their 'top three', leading 
to double counting. Probably between 60 and 70 percent 
would have given one or the other of these reasons. 
118. See Table 61 above. For example, eliminating 'labour 
problems• certainly makes control of production easier. 
119. Strictly, this is not correct. The assumptions about 
'freedom • , 'individuality' and 'utility maximization' 
could also be modified. For example, utility could 
be measured in terms not only of profit but also of 
prestige. A number of farmers felt that some (other!) 
farmers did purchase capital equipment, such as combines, 
more for the status it appeared to confer than for its 
economic value. But none of these three assumptions 
seems to need significant qualification. 
120. See Metcalf: op.cit., p.68. 
121. Ibid. See also Mansfield, E.: "Technical Change and 
the Rate of Imitation", in Rosenberg: op.cit. (1971), 
p.310. 
122. See R.S.A. Commission of Enquiry into Agriculture: op.cit. 
(1970), p.l64. 
123. Ibid., p.l63. 
124. See van Wyk's series of articles published in the widely-
read "Farming in South Africa" (published in English 
and Afrikaans) in 1964. (See note 110, and Chapter 
l, note 49, above.) 
125. See note 98 above. 
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126. Mansfield: op.cit., p.310. 
127. Almost all maize produced in Areas A and B of South Africa, 
as defined by the Maize Board {see Figure l above), must 
be marketed through the Board at a standard price per 
grade fixed by the Board. {See also Chapter 3, note 
3 7 above . ) 
128. with fewer moving parts, the durability of PTO combines 
is generally greater than that of SP combines. Data 
collected by the Department of Agriculture in its annual 
survey of maize production costs in 1976, showed the 
average age of PTO combines in the Western Transvaal 
to be about 4 years. SP combines by comparison were 
on average about 2 years old. {See also Section 3.1.1.2, 
esp. p.43 above.) 
129. This would presumably have occurred as those who had 
combines gained experience and their experience became 
more widely known. {See also R.S.A. Commission of 
Enquiry into Agriculture: op.cit. {1970), pp.l63-l64.) 
130. See Section 6.3.3, p.226, 227 above. 
131. See Section 3.2, esp. pp.75-76 above. 
132. See Table 64 and Figure 50 above. 
133. One could argue that the gradual fall in information 
and learning costs led to the purchase of more combines 
and so loosened any constraint on farm size imposed by 
labour shortages. 
Peterson and Hayami make the important point that "as 
nonfarm earnings increase, farm size {in terms of output) 
tends to increase in order to provide farmers with somewhat 
comparable incomes. In economic terms we might say 
that as the opportunity cost of {farmers' own) labour 
increases, unit labor costs increase on small farms relative 
to those on larger farms, hence scale economies appear 
and average farm size .increases" {op.cit., p.531). Boom 
conditions between about 1972 and 1975 would presumably 
have led to a rise in nonfarm incomes. Assuming some 
lag in the relationship, one would predict, on the basis 
of Peterson and Hayami's argument, that some expansion 
of farm size should occur in the mid-'70s -which did, 
in fact, happen {see, e.g., Figure 10 above). However, 
this is surely but one of many factors {see also Section 
3.2, pp.75..,..76 above). 
134. See note 27 above. 
136. Presumably, land rent would remain the same, at least 
in the short run, regardless of the method of harvesting. 
But,ceteris paribus, the interest on capital would increase 
the greater the amount invested, so both this and profit 
would increase with mechanical harvesting {for farms 
larger than the critical size- see note 110 above). 
All this assumes that the land and capital equipment 
are owned by the farmer. If not, the change in the 
size of s, surplus value accruing to the farmer, is 
indeterminate without further information. 
137. See Section 6.3.3, esp. p.227-228 above. 
138. See Section 6.2.2, esp. p.201~202 above. 
139. See, e.g., Tables 18 and 23 above, showing the reduction 
in seasonal and permanent workers employed in harvesting 
and delivery. 
140. See note 64 above. 
141. Some farmers said that their status as citizens of inde-
pendent foreign countries had made both workers and immi-
gration and labour officials 'more cheeky'. 
142. See Section 6.3.2.1, esp. p.210 above. 
143. There are several reasons for this: first, the cost 
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of transport is eliminated; Second, though the registra-
tion of all workers is required by law, generally only 
permanent workers and seasonal workers who must be re-
cruited through official channels, i.e. those who do 
not live on white farms, are registered in practice. 
Few farmers said that they registered seasonal workers who lived 
on their own or neighbouring farms, partly because these 
workers were usually drawn from a pool, and it was not 
always the same people who worked each day, making regis-
tration difficult. Registration involves the payment 
of fees, so non-registration would avoid this cost. 
And third, it is not necessary to provide accommodation 
and at least some of the food normally supplied to teams 
of migrant workers, to workers who sleep and eat at home. 
144. See Table 34 and Table 44 above. 
145. See Tables 25 and 26 above. 
146. See, e.g. Braverman: op.cit., pp.213-233. 
147. See Table 60 and Figure 48 above. 
148. See Table 59 and Figure 47 above. 
149. See Section 6.2.2,, p.202 above. 
150. See, e.g., R.S.A. Commission of Enquiry into Agriculture: 
op.cit. (1970), p.l75. 
151. For example, in contrast to many other items of capital 
equipment, no tariff duty is payable on the import of 
agricultural machinery; both petrol and diesel fuel 
are available to farmers more cheaply than to the public 
in general; until very recently, lower-than-market 
interest rates were charged on loans to farmers by the 
Land Bank and by agricultural co-operatives; and, since 
1977 it has been possible for tax purposes to write 
off the entire cost of new capital goods in the year 
of purchase. (See R.S.A. Commission of Enquiry into 
Agriculture (chairman S.J. d~ Plessis): Third Report, 
RP 19/1972, Chapter V for further details.) 
152. See e.g., Morris, Nattrass, Knight: op.cit., in Wilson, 
Hendrie and Kooy: op.cit. 
153. See Fiske, S.G.: "Minimum Wages Won't Help", Farmer's 
Weekly, issue no.72015, 16th April 1982, p.30. 
154. See R.S.A. Office of the Economic Adviser to the Prime 
Minister: op.cit., Vol. 1, pp.34-35; Vol. 2, ~p.l4-
15. 
155. See, e.g., Howard and King: op.cit., pp.l6, 200. 
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156. This is not to suggest that there is little to distinguish 
neo-classical and Marxian economic theory, merely that, 
at least in this context, there is some overlap in their 
analyses of the reasons for technical change. 
NOTES - CHAPTER 7 
1 . See Section 1.1, p.l. 
2 . See Table 17. 
3 • See Table 22. 
4 . See Table 18. 
5 • See Table 23. 
6 . See Tables 19 and 24. 
7 . See Table 20. 
8 . See Table 21. 
9. This can be calculated by multiplying the data in Table 
19 by the relevant figure in Table 20. The number of 
worker-weeks per 1 000 tonnes fell from 690 for Group 
A in 1968 to 103 for Group .D in 1981 - roughly an 85 
percent drop. 
10. See Table 25. 
11. See Table 26. 
12. See Figure 22. 
13. See Figare 23. 
14. See Section 4 • 3 I p.l06. ' 
15. See Table 28. 
16. See Table 29. 
17. The difference is between 30 and 35 percent on a per 
farming unit basis and between 55 and 60 percent on a 
per 1 000 hectare basis. (See Tables 30A and 30B.) 
18. See Section 4 o 5 I p.l22. 
19. See Table 23A. 
20. Sources: as for Table 23A. 
21. See Table 34. 
22. See Table 36. 
2 3. See Table 40. 
24. See Table 41. Note: the proportion of men, women and 
children in teams is unknown. Only the percentage of 
teams that included each is certain. 
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25. See Table 42. 
26. See Table 43. 
27. See Table 35. 
28. See Table 44. 
29. See Table 46. 
30. See Table.49. 
31. See Table 50. 
32. See Table 51. 
33. See Table 45. 
34. See Table 57. 
35. See Table 60. 
36. See Table 59. 
37. Farmers who switched from hand to combine harvesting in 
the second half of the '70s still gave labour shortage 
as an important reason for doing so. 
38. Also, were those who left farm jobs of their own accord 
able to find other employment? 
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39. See Chapter 1, note 1, and Section 7.2.2.2, esp. pp.251-253. 
40. Sources: (of Table 65) 
Seasonal agriculture: Table 32. 
Permanent agriculture: Table 23A. 
Mining (total): R.S.A. Department of Statistics: South 
African Statistics (1974) etc., p.7.5; (1982).p.7.6; 
mophuthatswan~: for 1970 and 1976, BENBO: op.cit. (1977), 
p.5l; for 1978-1981, TEBA: personal communication, 
op.cit. 
Manufacturing: R.S.A. Department of Statistics: South 
African Statistics (1974) etc., p.7.7; (1982), p.7.6. 
Construction: R.S.A. Department of Statistics: South 
African Statistics (1974) etc., p.7.12; (1982), p.7.7. 
Domestic work: except for domestic workers on white farms, 
no regular count is made of the total number of domestic 
workers in South Africa. It was therefore necessary to 
estimate the trend. From data collected annually by 
the Department of Statistics, it is possible to calculate 
the average number of domestic workers per 100 white-owned 
houses in the 12 principle urban areas: 
r 
TABLE 65A: Percentage Distribution of Houses According to 
Number of Full-Time Domestic Workers 
Percentage of houses with Average No. 
Year of workers 
no 4 or more per 100 
workers 1 worker 2 workers 3 workers workers houses 
1968 49,3 41,1 7,6 1,6 0,4 62,9 
1969 50,1 41,3 7,0 1,4 0,2 60,4 
1970 49,6 41,3 7,6 1,1 0,4 61,6 
1971 49,6 41,3 7,6 1,2 0,3 61,5 
1972 51,2 40,2 7,2 1,1 0,3 59,3 
1973 52,2 39,1 7,4 1,0 0,2 57,8 
1974 55,3 37,4 6,2 0,8 0, 3 53,6 
1975 56,2 37,3 5,4 0,9 0,2 51,7 
1976 59,0 35,3 4,9 0,7 0,1 47,7 
1977 60,6 34,0 4,7 0,6 0,1 45,7 
1978 62,0 32,9 4,5 0,4 0,2 44,0 
1979 61,1 34,0 4,2 0,6 0,1 44,7 
1980 60,0 35,3 4,1 0,6 0,0 45,3 
Source 
100 
R.S.A. Department of Statistics: Statistics of Houses and 
Domestic Servants October 1972 and of Flats May 1972, Twelve 
Principal Urban Areas in South Africa (11-03-08), Table 9, 
pp.l3-14; 1973 (11-03-09), Table A9, pp.7-8; 1974 (11-03-10), 
Table A9, p.8; 1975 (11-03-11), Table A9, p.8; 1976 (ll-03-12), 
Table A9, p.8; 1977 (ll-03-13), Table A9, p.8; 1978 {11-03-14), 
Table A9, p.8; 1979 (11-03-15), Table A9, p.8; 1980 (11-03-16), 
Table A9, p.8. 
The average number of domestic workers per 100 houses was cal-
culated on the assumption that where there were 4 .or more domestic 
workers per house, the average was 4,5 workers. Because of 
the very small percentage of houses involved, the overall 
average is not sensitive to this assumption. 
From 1972 a distinction was made between full- and part-time 
domestic workers. If the data for both categories is used, 
the average number of domestic workers per 100 white houses 
fell from 93,6 in 1972 to 78,6 in 1980. Proportionately, 
this is a slightly smaller fall than for full-time workers 
only. 
What needs to be known to calculate the total number of domestic 
workers employed in the 12 metropolitan areas is the number of 
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houses each year. Data is available only for 1951, 1960 
and 1970 from the respective population censuses. To 
estimate the numbers concerned, the average (compound) 
growth rate between 1960 and 1970 was calculated and extra-
polated to 1980. On this basis, the number of houses is 
found to be approximately 307 000 in 1968 and 461 000 in 
1980. By multiplying the number of houses by the average 
number of domestic workers per 100 houses, one arrives at 
an estimate of the total number of domestic workers in the 
12 areas concerned. 
If it is assumed that the trend in the remaining urban areas 
is similar, then an index of total employment of domestic 
workers can be calculated. The index in Table 65 is for 
full-time domestic workers. 
Note: 1. Roughly 60 percent of domestic workers between 
1972 and 1980 were employed on a full-time basis. 
2. Roughly 59 percent of white-occupied houses in 
the 1951, 1960 and 1970 censuses were in the 
12 principal urban.areas. (See: R.S.A. Depart-
ment of Statistics: Statistics of Houses and 
Domestic Servants, etc., (1980), Table A.l, p.l.) 
41. See Table 25. 
42. See Section 6.3.2.1, esp. pp.2ll, 214. 
43. See Tables 41 and 50. 
44. See Table 26. 
45. See Section 6.3.2.3, especially discussion of Figure 5l(a), 
pp.218-219. 
46. i.e. 'greater' South Africa, including the. 'independent 
black states' . 
47. See Table 52. 
~8. In 1970, the mining industry recruited 47 236 workers in 
the Transkei. By 1976 this had risen to 122 135, an increase 
of 159 percent. (Source:, TEBA: personal communication, 
op.cit.) 
.9. Between 1977 and 1981, the level at times rose as high as 149 874 
~ and fell as low as 109 936 (ibid.). But there was no con-
sistent rise or fall. 
10. Estimates by region were only begun in January 1979. 
The number of black workers (of both sexes) reported to 
have been employed in white agriculture was 873 000 in Octo-
ber 1977 and 1 093 000 in October 1981. During the same 
period reported unemployment fell from 633 000 to 408 000. 
(Source: R.S.A. Department of Statistics: Statistical 
News Release P27.3, 18th September 1978, Table I; 
January 1982, Table 1.) 
15th 
52. The fluctuations in the upward trend of male employment 
were comparatively small: this is illustrated by the 
fact that the proportion of all black male employment 
contributed by agriculture never rose above 24,3 percent 
and never fell below 21,4 percent between October 1977 
and October 1981. There was no obvious seasonality in 
the data. 
By comparison, black female employment in agriculture 
fluctuated much more noticeably- between 13,7 and 19,4 
percent of total employment. A fairly regular annual 
cycle, reaching its high point in June and its low point 
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in October or November, is also evident. It may be more 
than merely coincidental that the only year in which the 
upswing in the cycle was not significant was 1979, in 
which the maize harvest was considerably below average. 
(See Table 16 and Figure 12 above for the Western Transvaal. 
The results were similarly poor in almost all other maize-
producing regions - see e.g., R.S.A. Maize Board: op.cit. 
(1981), Annexure VI, p.2o.)· (See also Eigure 18.) 
(Employment data source: R.S.A. Department of Statistics: 
Statistical News Release, P27.3, 18th September 1978; 11th 
January 1979; 14th May 1980; 18th August 1980; 18th 
December 1980; 20th May 1981; 7th October 1981; 15th 
January 1982; 22nd July 1982; 22nd October 1982 - Table 
1 in all cases.) 
53. See Section 1.6. 
54. See Section 1.4. 
55. A rise in permanent farm employment is not irreconcilable 
with the slight fall in the number of permanent workers 
per 1 000 ha engaged in harvesting and delivery between 
1977 and 1981 (see Table 23). On the one hand, not all 
permanent workers on any farm need be involved in harvesting, 
and on the other, there was a slight increase in the area 
of maize planted in the second half of the •70s (see Sec-
tion 3.2, p.78 above). 
56. Commenting on the difference between the CPS and his own 
estimates of unemployment between 1978 and 1981, Simkins 
points out: 11 When one looks for the sectors that would 
account for the faster CPS employment growth, they turn 
out to be ..• agriculture, commerce and services, just 
the sectors where our estimates are least firmly based 
because of the difficulties of measuring both wage and 
subsistence employment in agriculture, the informal sec-
tor and domestic service. It is clear, however, (that) 
the CPS reports in the short-term employment growth rates 
much faster than long term rates in these sectors. 
This may be grounds (sic) for suspecting the accuracy 
of the CPS - or perhaps under conditions of slow growth 
of employment in other sectors, people are crowded into 
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low-income jobs in these sectors (as) an alternative to 
unemployment ... (Simkins, C.E.W.: 11 Structural Unemployment 
Revisited 11 , SALDRU Fact Sheet No. 1, University of Cape 
Town, December 1982, p.lO.) 
57. See Section 4.5, p.l22.' 
58. See, e.g., Table 53. 
59. The level varied annually between 190 000 to 200 000 and 
250 000 to 260 000. (Source as in note 52.) 
60. See Table 65 and note 40. 
61. Non-agricultural employment in black rural areas is limited, 
and Simkins estimates no increase in agricultural employ-
ment in these areas at least since 1970. (See Simkins: 
op.cit. (1982), Table 4, p.5.) 
62. For index of urban domestic service employment,see Table 
65. The number of domestic workers on farms fell from 
about 779 000 in 1969 to 514 000 in 1978. (Sources: 
R.S.A. Department of Statistics: South African Statistics 
(1974) etc., p.7.5; R.S.A. Department of Statistics: 
Statistical News Release P.9, lOth July 1980, p.3.) 
63. e.g. KwaZulu, Lebowa. The term •national states• is 
used by the CPS to distinguish non-•independent• black 
areas from •independent neighbouring states• such as Transkei 
and Bophuthatswana. 
64. Source: R.S.A. Department of Statistics: Statistical 
News Release P.27.3, 14th May 1980; 24th June 1982. 
65. Ibid. The 8,8 percent may be incorrect because the rates 
for males and females were both higher than this, at 9,6 
and 11,1 percent respectively. 
66. The unemployment rate for males both in November 1980 
and in November 1981 was given by the CPS as 0,8 percent. 
For females in the same months, it was 8,2 and 5,5 percent 
respectively. (Source: R.S.A. Department of Statistics: 
Statistical News Release P.27.3, 20th May 1981; 24th 
June 1982.) 
67. The comparative figures for the same months as in note 
66 were: males 9,8 and 9,6 percent respectively, and 
females 17,7 and 11,1 percent respectively (ibid.). 
68. 11 For purposes of the survey the unemployed are defined 
as persons who desire to work and who comply with all 
the following requirements: 
did not work, i.e. worked less than 5 hours during 
the previous 7 days, 
attempted to find work during the previous month, 
are able to accept a position within one week, 
are between the ages of 15 and 64 in the case of men 
or 15 and 59 in the case of women". 
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(R.S.A. Department of Statistics: Statistical News Release 
P.27, 18th September 1978, p.2.) 
It is instructive to compare this definition to the follow-
ing observation by Braverman: " ... unemployment is only 
the officially counted part of the relative surplus of 
the working population which is necessary for the accumula-
tion of capital and which is itself produced by it. 
This relative surplus population, the industrial reserve 
army, takes a variety of forms in modern society, including 
the unemployed; the sporadically employed; the part-
time employed, the mass of women who, as housewoikers, 
form a reserve for the 'female occupations'; the armies 
of migrant labor, both agricultural and industrial; the 
black population with its extraordinarily high rates of 
unemployment; and the foreign reserves of labor." (Braver-
man: op.cit., p.386). The context of Braverman's study 
was the United States, but these categories are no less 
present in South Africa. 
69. Simkins: op.cit. (1982), p.lO. 
70. Simkins: op.cit. (1981), p.8. 
71. van der Merwe: op.cit., Table 8, p.73. 
72. See, e.g. Bromberger: op.cit.; Gerson: op.cit. 
73. In interviews, many farmers complained of the number of 
'leegleers' (idlers) in the district and of squatters 
on farms where there were no whites resident. 
74. See Morris: op.cit., esp. pp.69-71,for a discussion of 
the legislation concerned. 
75. See Table 53. 
76. Simkins: op.cit. (1982), p.lO. 
77. Berg, M. (ed.): "Technology and Toil in Nineteenth Century 
Britain", CSE Books, London, 1979, p.6. 
78. Urbanization is another important consequence, though 
it falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
79. In 1959, before the maize harvesting revolution, but when 
mechanical wheat harvesting equipment had long been in 
use, harvesting machinery contributed no more than 2 percent 
to the total sales of agricultural implements, while 
threshing machines accounted for about 8~ percent. (See 
R.S.A. Commission of Inquiry into the Cost and Profit 
Margins in respect of Agricultural Implements and the 
Components thereof (chairman: 
RP 10/1962, Table 44, p.SO). 
at present. 
H.J.J. Reynders): Report 
Later data is not available 
80. The last census of the manufacturing sector was in 1976. 
81. R.S.A. Department of Statistics: Census of Manufacturing, 
1967-68 (10-21-17), Table 2.1, p.62; ibid., 1976 
(10-21-32), Table 7.1, p.l41. 
82. The Reynders Commission recorded that 4 072 workers of 
all races were employed in the manufacture of agricultural 
implements in South Africa in 1958. By 1968 this had 
risen to 8 078 more or less a doubling - but the total 
subsequently fell to 6 922 in 1976. (Sources: R.S.A. 
Commission of Inquiry into the Cost and Profit Margins 
etc.: op.cit., Table 45, p.SO; R.S.A. Department of 
Statistics: Census of Manufacturing etc., 1967-68, Table 
2.1, p.62; 1976, Table 7.1, p.l41.) 
83. See Section 1.3, esp. p .4 and Section 4.5, p.l22 .. 
84. In 1959, the number of workers of all races employed in 
the wholesaling of agricultural implements was 2 391, 
as against 4 594 in production. No record of employment 
in retailing is available. (R.S.A. Commission of Inquiry 
into the Costs and Profit Margins etc.: op.cit., p.75; 
Table 45, p.SO.) 
85. It is not known whether most sacks were imported or not. 
If they were imported, the effect of bulk delivery on 
employment in sack manufacturing and distribution would 
have been very small. 
86. Berg: op.cit., p.6. 
87. See Table 61 and Section 6.3.3, esp. p. 227-228. 
88. Braverman: op.cit., esp. parts I and II. 
89. Table 59 shows a large drop in the number of machine 
operators (and manual workers) per 1 000 t and per 1 000 
ha harvested, between 1968 and 1977. But the proportion-
ately smaller decline in the number of permanent workers 
between 1969 and 1976 (see Table 23A) suggests that rela-
tively few drivers were actually laid off, harvesting 
and delivery being only two of many tasks performed by 
them. 
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90. Though Table 60 shows only a small increase over the 13 
years in the proportion of permanent workers who operated 
machines to those who performed manual tasks, if the reduc-
tion in the number of seasonal workers - all of whom were 
manual - is taken into account, then the ratio moves con-
siderably in favour of machine operators. 
91. This may be starting to change. For example, the Orange-
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Vaal General Workers Union includes a number of farm workers. 
But international experience suggests that it will be 
a long time before farm workers• organizations make a 
noticeable impact. The increase in the proportion of 
full-time permanent farm workers may accelerate the process. 
92. See Section 4.3, p.l06. 
93. Note: the value of housing was not included in the calcu-
lation of the all-inclusive wage of permanent workers 
in Table 26. (For reasons, see Chapter 4, note 60.) 
94. Most farmers visited had built brick houses for their 
permanent workers - the traditional mud and stone huts 
built by workers with their own materials on their arrival 
are now in the minority in the Western Transvaal. Some 
farmers have also provided communal recreation facilities 
though few seem to have built baths or showers, and the 
number of toilets is almost always small (relative to 
the number of households). Many farmers said that improved 
houses and education facilities ~ere a stronger attraction 
to good workers than good cash wages, and that, with the 
pull of industry becoming ever greater, it would be essen-
tial in the future to provide these facilities to retain 
good workers. 
95. Two weeks paid leave between seasons was virtually standard 
on the 60 farms visited. Only in a few cases did conditions 
differ. On most farms, sick leave was paid too, though 
not what was called 'Maandagsiekte' (week-end hangover)! 
Some farmers required a doctor's certificate before paying. 
96. See Sections 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.2. 
97. See Sections 3.1.3.1 and 3.1.3.2. 
98. See Table 58. 
99. See Table 59. 
100. Because of the long hours and the tiring nature of the 
work, two drivers - a principal and a relief - are often 
assigned to one combine. (See Chapter 3, note 21.) 
101. Some farmers spoke of preferring to travel hundreds of 
kilometres rather than going to the trouble and expense 
of delivering in sacks. Having geared one's harvesting 
to delivery in bulk, using sacks means having to purchase 
sacks, obtain a scale, hire additional workers (men, who 
are often not easy to find) and slow down the harvesting 
rate to fit in with the slower delivery rate. So farmers' 
attitudes are understandable. (See also Chapter 3, note 
41 . ) 
102. See van Wyk: op.cit. (1970), pp.l6-20. 
103. See, e.g., R.S.A. Commission of Enquiry into Agriculture: 
op.cit. (1970), pp.l71-173. 
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104. See, e.g., The Farm Labour Project: "Submission to National 
Manpower Commission on Farm Labour", no place of publica-
tion given, 1982, (ISBN 06020063114), pp.25-28 and photo-
copies of press-cuttings on "Health Conditions, Accidents". 
105. See Section 5.3.3, esp. Table 57 and discussion thereof. 
106. See Table 52. 
107. See Tables 53 and 56. 
108. Peterson and Hayami: op.cit., p.530. 
109. Ibid. 
110. See Section 1.5~ p. 8. 
111. See Chapter 1, notes 17 and 33. 
112. Ruttan, V.W. and T. Stout: "Regional Differences of Tech-
nical Change in American Agriculture", Journal of Farm 
Economics, Vol. 42, February 1960, pp.52-68, referred 
to in Peterson and Hayami: _op.cit., pp.531-532. 
113. See Section 1.3, esp. p.4. 
114. This includes both the increase in the real wages of per-
manent workers and the shift of seasonal jobs from 'out-
siders' to the families of permanent workers. 
115. Braverman: op.cit., p.386. 
116. Gerson: op.cit., pp.l51-152. 
117. Howard and King: op.cit., p.l96. 
'118. Ibid., p.l99. 
119. Ibid., p.201. Howard and King's quotation from Marx 
is a,;>posite: "Between 1849 and 1859, a rise in wages 
practically insignificant, though accompanied by falling 
prices of corn, took place in the English agricultural 
districts ... what did the farmers do now? ... They intro-
duced more machinery, and in a moment the labourers were 
redundant again in a proportion satisfactory even to the 
farmers. There was now 'more capital' laid out in agricul-
ture than before and in a more productive form. With 
this the demand for labour fell, not only relatively but 
absolutely." (Marx: op.cit., p.638.) 
120. Ibid., pp.201-202. 
121. Ibid., pp.l95-203. 
122. "Marx considered the twin processes of the centralization 
of capital and the growth of the reserve army as the most 
important .structural factors that would bring class conflict 
to a revolutionary pitch" (Howard and King: op.cit., 
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A • AI...GEMENE INLIGITNG Datum: 
1. N a am: 
2. Adres: 
3. Landdros-distrik 
4. Telefoon nr 
Sa. Status van persoon met wie onderhoud gevoer word: eienaar/mede-eienaar/bestuurder/huurboer/ 
ander ( bes. ) 
Sb. Getal mede-eienaars: 
Destyds 
6a. Indien onderhoud nie met eienaar nie, is eie-
naar (naam onnodig): boer/werk in die stad/ 
openbare maatskappy/private maatskappy/ander 
(bes.) 
6b. Indien (mede-)eienaar: is p1aas gekoop/geerf 
6c. Ander p1ase: besit/medebesit/gehuur/ander 




7c. Gewasse (opperv1akte): 
Aansienlik verander sedert 1968? 
Nee(x) 
Ja( j) Besonderhede (insl. rede(s}, datum) 
Destyds 
8. Handelsdiere (getal): 
9. Belangrikste vorm van inkomste: 
lOa. Plaasbestuurder: ras: 
lOb. Bestuurder se werk: 
lla. Eienskappe van land: plat/heuwelagtig/ 
klipperig/moerasagtig/ander (bes.) 
llb. Grondtipe(s) waarin mielies verbou word: 
12a. Basiese mielieoesmetode: meganies/hand 








Aansienlik verander sedert 1968? 
Nee(x) 
Ja( J) Besonderhede (insl. rede(s), datum) 
'* 
Destyds 
14a. Alle voltydse arbeiders: (Man = M, Vrou = V, Kind = K) 
Taak Perm. Trek- Pend- Ander (bes. ) 








huis- M M M M 
bediendes v v v v 
K K K K 
ander (bes.) 
14b. Indien nie permanente plaasinwoner, familie 
se woonplek: 
14c. Indien pendelaar, reisafstand en vervoer-
middel: 
Aansienlik verander sedert 1968? 
Nee(x) 
Ja( .; ) Besonderhede ( insl. rede(s), datum) 
Taak Perm. Trek- Pend- Ander 








huis- M M M M 
bediendes v v v v 
K K K K 
ander (bes.) 
Aansienlik verander sedert 1968? 
Destyds Nee{x) 
Ja { .; ) Besonderhede {insl. rede ( s), datum) 
lSa. Alle seisoenarbeiders: {Man = M, Vrou = V, Kind = K) 
Taal.:. Perm. Trek- Pend- Ander ( bes . ) Taak Perm. Trek- Pend- Ander (be 
plaas- arbeider elaar plaas- arbeider elaar (bes.) 
inwoner inwoner 
M M M M M M M M 
v v v v v v v v 
oesvolk K I< K K oesvolk K K K K 
M M M M M M M M 
v v v v v v v v 
optelmense K K K K optelmense K K K K 
M M M M M M M M 
v v v v v v v v 
onkruidmense K K K K onkruidmense K K K K 
M M M M M M M M 
v v v v v v v v 
ander ( bes . ) K K K K ander ( bes . ) K K K K 
M M M M M M M M 
v v v v v v v v 
K K K K K K K K 
M M M M M M M M 
v v v v v v v v 
K K K K K K K K 
M M M M M M M M 
v v v v v v v v 
K K K K K K K K 
Destyds 
15b. Bron van seisoenarbeid: 
- families van voltydse plaasarbeiders op 
eie/ander plaas: (distrik(te)) 
swart plapies in Transvaal/Bop'tswana: 
(distrik(te)) 
swart dorpe in Bop'tswana 
(dorpe) 
swartwoonbuurtes naby blanke dorpe in 
Transvaal: (dorp(e)) 
- woonvolk op eie/ander plaas: 
(distrik(te)) 
- ander (bes. insl. distrik/plek) 
15c. Indien pendelaar, reisafstand en vervoer-
middel: 
15d. Woonplek gedurende indiensneming: tuis/ 
plaas/ander (bes.) 
16. Getal permanente families op plaas: 
ras(se) 
eienaar(s) 
Aansienlik verander sedert 1968? 
Nee(x) 
Ja( v) Besonderhede (insl. rede(s), datum) 
Destyds 






















wat op ders 
plaas woon 
Seisoen-arbeiders 
van ander plekke 
terwyl hulle op 
plaas woon 
Aansienlik verander sedert 1968? 
Nee(x) 






wat op ders 
plaas woon 
Seisoen-arbeiders 
van ander plekke 
terwyl hulle op 
plaas woon 
Destyds 
Opvoeding van arbeiders 
20a. Het die meeste arbeiders in lae primere 
skool/hoer primere skool/hoer skool geslaag? 
20b. Na-skoolse tegniese opleiding: 
20c. Plaaskinders meestal op skool op: dorp in 
Transvaal/dorp in Bop'tswana/~ plaasskool/ 
ander (bes.) 
20d. Afstand van skool: 
20e. Plaasskool of eie plaas? Ja/Nee 
Aansienlik verander sedert 1968? 
Nee(x) 
Ja( J) Besonderhede (insl. rede(s), datum) 
B. BESONDERHEDE VAN MIELIEOESMETODE: MEGANIES (Vra net as boer meganies oes) 
Destyds 
Stropers 

















jaar nuut/ koop koop metode 






Aansienlik verander sedert 1968? 
Nee(x) 
Ja( J) Besonderhede (insl. rede(s), datum) 







S-A/ Enjin- Verkoop/ 






jaar nuut/ koop verkoop koop-metode 







ld. Indien mede-besit, getal mede-eienaars: 
Gebruik hulle ook stroper(s)? ja/nee 
le. Indien gehuur, rente: 
2a. 
2b. 
Indien sleepstroper(s), trekker(s) gebruik: 









besit/ jaar nuut/ koop 










Aansienlik verander sedert 1968? 
Nee(x) 
Ja( J) Besonderhede (insl. rede(s), datum) 




















jaar nuut/ koop verkoop 





2c. Indien mede-besit, getal mede-eienaars: 
Gebruik hulle ook trekker(s)? ja/nee 
2d. Indien gehuur, rente: 
Arbeiders 
3a. Getal in mielieoesproses gebruik: 
(Voltyds = V, Seisoen = S) 
3b. Oesperiode: 
dae/week 
Bestuurders Optelmense Ander (bes) 
v v v 
s s s 
getal weke 
uur/dag 








Bestuurders Optelmense Ander (bes) 
Aansienlik verander sedert 1968? 
Nee(x) 
Ja( J) Besonderhede (insl. rede(s), datum) 
Bestuurders Optelmense Ander (bes) 
v v v 





Losvolk se beloning in laaste jaar: 
Kontant 'Yc:Opbrengs Sakke Kos ander 





Indien % opbrengs, totale opbrengs: 
Aansienlik verander sedert 1968? 
Nee(x) 
Ja( J) Besonderhede (insl. rede(s), datum) 
Indien % opbrengs, totale opbrengs: 
Voltydse arbeiders se beloning in laaste jaar: 
Kontant 'YeOpbrengs Sakke Kos Huis Land 
mielies (gratis) (gra~is) (gratis) 
ander (bes . ) 














Losvolk se beloning in laaste jaar: 




Indien % opbrengs, totale opbrengs: 
Destyds 
4. Koste van mielieoes: 
Verlede seisoen 
laaste seisoen van 
sleeps troop 
laaste seisoen van 
handoes 
4. Verwante operasies: 
Operasie 








Aansienlik verander sedert 1968? 
Nee(x) 
Ja( J) Besonderhede (insl. rede(s), datum) 
C. BESONDERHEDE VAN MIELIEOESPROSES: HANDOES (Vra net as boer nog met die hand oes) 
Destyds 
Basiese oesmetode 
la. Elke oester het sak: ja/nee 
lb. Trekker en sleepwa in landerye/sleepwa 
langs landerye gelos 
lc. Sakke in sleepwa leeggegooi/sakke byeenge-
maak om. na dorsmasjien vervoer te word 
ld. Los koppe in dorsmasjien gegooi/sakke in 
dorsmasjien leeggegooi 
le. Lewering: massa/sakke 





Met sleep- Met dorsmasjien 





Aansienlik verander sedert 1968?, 
Nee(x) 
Ja( /) Besonderhede (insl. rede(s), datum) 
Met sleep- Met dorsmasjien Aanvullende 
wa gebruik gebruik besonderhede 
1 1 Nommer: 1 
2 2 2 
l 1 verkoop/ 
2 2 geskrap 
Destyds 
Met sleep- Met dorsmasjien 
wa gebruik gebruik 
jaar 1 1 
vervaardig 2 2 
jaar 1 1 
gekoop 2 2 
nuut/ 1 1 
gebruik 2 2 
eniin 1 1 
krag 2 2 
besit/ 1 1 
mede-besit 2 2 
gehuur 1 1 
koopmetode 2 2 
kontant/H-K/huur- 1 1 
gebruik 2 2 
Indien mede-besit, geta1 mede-eienaars: 
Gebruik hu11e ook die trekker(s): ja/nee 
Indien gehuur, rente: 
2b. Sleepwa(ens) in landerye gebruik: 
geta1: kapasiteit: 
Aansienlik verander sedert 1968? 
Nee(x) 
Ja( J) Besonderhede (insl. rede(s), datum) 
Met sleep- Met dorsmasjien Aanvullende 
wa gebruik gebruik besonderhede 
1 1 jaar 
2 2 verkoop-
1 1 prys/ 
2 2 skrap 

























Indien mede-besit, getal mede-eienaars: 
Gebruik hulle ook die dorsmasjien(e): 
ja/nee 
Indien gehuur, rente: 
2 
Aansienlik verander sedert 1968? 
Nee(x) 









Aansienlik verander sedert 1968? 
Destyds Nee(x) 
Ja( /) Besonderhede (insl. rede ( s) , datum) 
3a. Getal in mielieoesproses gebruik: 
Bestuur- Voor- Oesters Dors- Ander (bes.) Bestuur- Voor- Oesters Dors- Ander ( bes. ) 
ders manne arbei- ders manne arbei-
ders ders 
v v v v v v v v v v 
s s s s s s s s s s 
3b. Oesperiode: getal weke: 
dae/week: uur/dag: 
3c. Werwing: basiese metode: 
Agente: 
Beloning van agente: 
Vervoermiddel: 
3d. Beloning van arbeiders: 
Bestuur- Voor- Oesters Dors- Ander (bes.) Bestuur- Voor- Oesters Dors- Ander ( bes. ) 
ders manne arbei- ders manne arbei-
ders ders 
Kontant M M 














Oesters Dors- Ander (bes.) 
arbei-
ders 
Indien % opbrengs, totale opbrengs: 
Aller lei 
4a. Onkruidbeheermetode: chemies/hand/meg. 
4b. Indien hand, word dieselfde oesarbeid 
gebruik? ja/nee 
Aansienlik verander sedert 1968? 
Nee(x) 
Ja( J) Besonderhede (insl. rede(s), datum) 
Bestuur- Voor-
ders manne 




4c. Gerame loonkoers: 
4d. Besonderhede van enige ander gebruik van 
seisoenarbeid: 
5 . Koste van mielieoes: 
totaal: R/ton: R/ha: 
6a. Mieliestroper ooit op plaas gebruik? 
ja/nee 
6b. Indien ja, jaar/jare: 
6c. Redes daarvoor: 
6d. Redes nie aangehou nie: 
Aansienlik verander sedert 1968? 
Nee(x) 
Ja( /) Besonderhede (insl. rede(s), datum) 
···&& 
D. REDES VIR KEUSE VAN MIELIEOESTEGNIEK 
(Afkortinge: ja, baie = /+; ja = .;; ja, effens J-; 
nee= x; onseker = ?) 
Oesarbeid 
la. Het die beloning van handoesarbeiders aansienlik toe-
geneem/afgeneem/dieselfde gebly voordat u besluit het 
om ~ stroper te koop/in die laaste jare? 
lb. Het dit u besluit(e) om mielies met ~ stroper/met die 
hand te oes beinvloed? ......... , ten gunste van/ 
teen ~ stroper te koop? 
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lc. In u mening, die belangrikste rede(s) waarom dit gebeur 
het is: 
- kompetisie van werkgewers wat hoer lone betaal: 
indien ja, watter werkgewers veral (name onnodig): 
- inflasie ..... 
- ander rede(s) (bes. ): 
- verwag u dat dit in die toekoms gaan styg? ..... 
2a. Was die beskikbaarheid van handoesarbeiders groter/ 
kleiner/dieselfde voordat u besluit het om 'n stroper 
te koop/in die laaste jare? 
2b. Besluit beinvloed, ens? ..... ten gunste van/teen 'n stroper 
te koop? 
2c. In u mening, die belangrikste rede(s) waarom dit gebeur 
het is: 
- meer/minder boere wat handoesarbeiders tegelykertyd 
soek: ..... 
- arbeid te ver weg verplaas ..... indien ja, redes: 
- regering het hul land gekoop ( jaar: 
- onwettige woonvolk deur regering/boer verplaas 
..... (jaar: ) 
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- voltydse plaasarbeider en familie wat op plaas 
gewoon het na eie l<euse na Bop' tswana/blanl<e 
s tad geg a an het, b. v. om werl< te soel<: ..... 
(jaar: ) 
stedelil<e swart woonbuurte deur regering na Bop'tswana 
verplaas: . . . . . .{ j aar: ) 
arbeiders nie verplaas nie, maar vrou nie oeswerl< 
soek nie: 
- ander rede(s): (jaar: 
- verwag u dat hulle in die toel<oms minder/meer/dieselfde 
beskil<baar sal word? 
3a. Het u gevind/vind u dat oesspanne redelil< mal<lil</ 
moeilik was/is om te beheer? ..... 
3b. Besluit beinvloed, ens? ..... ten gunste van/teen~ 
stroper te l<oop. 
3c. In u mening, wat is/was die belangril<ste rede(s) daarvoor? 
- oesarbeiders is meestal on/betroubare persone 
- oesspan het te groot/l<leiner/op ~ redelil<e getal 
geword/gebly 
- dit is redelik maklik/moeilik om oesspanne met kos te 
voorsien 
- oesspanne is redelil< maklil</moeilik om te behuis 
- geld om oesspanne weekliks te beloon is redelik 
mal<lik/moeilik om te l<ry en te bestuur 
- betroubare voormanne is redelik maklik/moeilik om te 
vind 
~ oesspanne vermors ~ groter deel van die mielieopbrengs 
as stropers 
- ander (bes.): 
Stropers 
4. Die pryse van beide stropers en brandstof het sedert 
1968 aansienlik toegeneem. Het dit u besluit om ~ 
selfaangedrewe stroper/~ sleepstroper te koop/nie te 
koop nie beinvloed? ..... ten gunste van/teen~ self-
aangedrewe stroper/'n sleepstroper/geen stroper te koop. 
Sa. Wanneer/as u ~ stroper bestel (het), was/sal dit 
dadelik/na ~ kart tyd/na ~ lang tyd gelewer (word)? 
Sb. Besluit beinvloed, ens? ..... ten gunste van/teen~ 
stroper te koop. 
6a. Watter geldbron het u/sal u gebruik om ~ stroper te 
koop? . eie geld/ lening . 
6b. Besluit beinvloed, ens? 
stroper te koop. 
..... ten gunste van/teen~ 
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7a. Indien lening gebruik, het u/sal u dit van 'n maatskappy/ 
private persoon gekry/vra? 
7b. Besluit beinvloed, ens? ... ten gunste van/teen 'n stroper 
te koop. 
8a. Indien van 'n maatskappy geleen, watter soort maatskappy, 
en watter soort lening? (naam van maatskappy onnodig): 
8b. Besluit beinvloed, ens? 
stroper te koop. 
..... ten gunste van/teen~ 
9a. Was dit redelik maklik/moeilik (of sal dit redelik 
maklik/moeilik wees) om geld te leen toe u/as u ~ 
stroper gekoop het/wil koop? 
9b. Besluit beinvloed, ens? 
stroper te koop. 
..... ten gunste van/teen~ 
lOa. Het rentekoerse op lenings om stropers te koop toegeneem/ 
afgeneem/ teen dieselfde vla k gebly toe u 'n s troper 
gekoop het. 
lOb. Besluit beinvloed, ens? 
stroper te koop. 
. .... ten gunste van/teen~ 
lOc. In die toekoms, as ~ stroper wil koop, sal ~ verandering 
in die rentekoerse op lenings vir stropers u besluit 
aansienlik beinvloed? ..... 
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lOd. Die inflasiekoers in Suid Afrika is in die laaste jare 
amper so hoog soos die rentekoerse op middel-termyn 
lenings (b.v. vir stropers). Het dit/sal dit u besluit 
beinvloed, ens? ..... ten gunste van/teen •n stroper te 
koop. 
11. In 1977 het die belastingswet verander om boere die 
valle koste van nuwe toerusting, b.v. ~ stroper, as ~ 
produksieuitgawe in die koopjaar te laat afskryf (d.w.s. 
100% waardeverminderingkoers). Het dit/sal dit u 
besluit beinvloed, ens? ..... ten gunste van/teen~ 
stroper te koop. 
Relatiewe pryse 
12a. In u mening, het die (totale) koste van mielies meganies 
te oes vinniger/stadiger/teen die selfde koers as die 
van handoes toegeneem, toe u besluit het om ~ stroper 
te koop? 
12b. Besluit beinvloed, ens? 
stroper te koop. 
..... ten gunste van/teen~ 
12c. Indien u nog met die hand oes, sal sulke relatiewe 
prys bewegings u besluit beinvloed? ..... ten gunste van/ 
teen ~ stroper te koop? 
13a. Wat was die goedkoopste manier om mielies op u plaas 
te oes toe u ~ stroper gekoop het? Selfaangedrewe 
stroper/sleepstroper/handoes. 
13b. Besluit beinvloed, ens? 
stroper te koop. 
ten gunste van/teen ~ 
13c. Indien u nog met die hand oes, wat is op die oomblik 
die goedkoopste manier om op u plaas mielies te oes? 
selfaangedrewe stroper/sleepstroper/handoes. 
13d. Beinvloed dit u besluit om met handoes aan te hou? 
..... ten gunste van/teen handoes. 
14a. Verander die goedkoopste, mielieoesmetode van seisoen 
tot seisoen op u plaas? ..... 
14b. Besluit beinvloed, ens? 
stroper te koop. 
ten gunste van/teen ~ 
14c. Indien goedkoopste metode verander, wat is die belang-
rikste rede(s) daarvoor? oesoppervlakte ..... 
mielieopbrengs/ha ..... duur van die oesperiode 
loonkoerse ..... brandstof en herstelkoste ..... 
ander (bes.) 
l4d. Verwag u dat dit goedkoper/duurder/dieselfde kosle 
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gaan wees om in die toekoms mielies op u plaas meganies 
te oes? 
14e. Besluit beinvloed, ens? 
meganies te oes. 
Aller lei 
..... ten gunste van/teen 
15a. Is dit vinniger om mielies met 'n stroper/met die hand 
op u plaas te oes? 
l5b. Besluit beinvloed, ens? 
stroper te koop. 
ten gunste van/teen ~ 
l5c. Waarom is spoed belangrik? bederwing van pitte ..... 
koppe val af ..... stam met koppe val plat ..... 
steel ..... kan vroeer ploeg ..... minder kans dat nie 
in massa kan !ewer nie ..... ander (bes.) 
15d. In u mening, hoeveel weke is op u plaas (i) ~ voldoende 
oesperiode ..... , (ii) die langste aanvaarbare oesperiode 
..... vir u mielieoes? 
~6a. Het stropers in die onlangse jare meer/minder doel-
treffend (t.o.v. vermors, spoed, ens) geword? 
16b. Het stropers in die onlangse jare meer/minder betrou-
baar (t.o.v. meganiese defekte) geword? 
16c. Het stropers in die onlangse jare meer/minder doel-
matig vir die omstandighede van u plaas (b.v. grootte, 
terrein) geword? 
16d. Besluit beinvloed, ens? ... tne gunste van/teen~ 
stroper te koop. 
17a. Is stropers gewoonlik redelik maklik/moeilik om in 
stnad te hou en te herstel? 
l7b. Het u stroper u ooit gedurende die mielieoes seisoen 
in die steek gelaat? (Bestuurder/werktuig-
kundige se skuld .... Defek in stroper ). 
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l7c. Indien ja, hoelank het dit stukkend gcbly? 
l7d. Wie doen die basiese instandhouding? 
l7e. Waar ~ord dit gedoen? 
l7f. l~dien op plaas en plaasarbeider, het hy ~ ople~dingskursus 
bygewoon·: ..... 
l7g. Is herstelfasiliteite redelik gcEjkoop/duur; redelik 
vinnig/stadig; van n redel1ke ho~ kwalitelt/sleg? 
l7h .. In u rnening, \~dtter skoolvJak is nodig om 'n stroper 
redelik goed in stand te kan hou? .... 
l7i. Het al hierdie fakto~e u besluit bein~loed, ens? ..... 
ten gunste van/teen ~ stroper te koop. 
l8a. Is opgeleide of ervare stroperbestuurders redelik 
maklik/moeilik om te kry? 
l8b. Hoe het u stroperbestuurders hul opleiding of ervaring 
gekry? 
l8c. In u mening is dit nodig om ~ ho~rskoolse opvoeding 
te h~ om ~ bekwame stroperbestuurder te wees? 
l8d. Is leerling-stroperbestuurders redelik maklik/moeilik 
om op die plaas op te lei? 
18e. Om trent hoe lank neem di t om hulle op te lei? 
l8f. Het al hierdie faktore u besluit beinvloed ens? 
ten gunste van/teen ~ stroper te koop. 
l9a. Is vermorsing groter met stropers/handoes? 
l9b. Besluit beinvloed, ens? 
stroper te koop. 
..... ten gunste van/teen~ 
20a. Gebruii u ~ stroper/kan u ~ stroper gebruik om op u 
plaas ander gewasse te oes? 
20b. Watter gewasse? 
20c. Besluit beinvloed, ens? 
stroper te koop. 
..... ten gunste van/teen~ 
2la. Is ulanderye redelik goed/sleg vir die gebruik van ~ 
.stroper gepas? 
2lb. Indien sleg, rede(s): 
2lc. Besluit be1nvloed, ens? 
stroper te koop. 
..... ten gunste van/teen~ 
22a. Leen u ooit ~ stroper aan/van iemand? 
2 2b. Hoeveel keer per jaar? .... (Hoeveel plase? 
22c. Huur u ooit ~ stroper aan/van iemand? 
22d. Hoeveel keer per jaar? . . . . (Hoeveel plase? 
22e. Gebruik u dit ooit op ~ ander plaas wat deur u besit/ 
mede-besit/gehuur/bestuur is? 
22f. Hoeveel keer per jaar? . . . . ( Hoeveel plase? 
22g. Waarom verkies u om dit te doen/nie te doen nie? 
23a. Leen/huur u gereeld ander toerusting? 
23b. Indien ja, watter toerusting? 
23c. Waarom verkies u om dit te doen/nie te doen nie? 
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24a. Sedert u ~ stroper gekoop het, het u ~ groter/kleiner/ 
dieselfde bedrag geld gedurende die oesseisoen nodig 
gehad (in vergelyking met handoes)? 
24b. Besluit be1nvloed, ens? 
stroper te koop. 
..... ten gunste van/teen~ 
25a. Was dit nodig/sal dit nodig wees om enige aansienlike 
veranderinge in die reeling van u plaas (b.v. in die 
grootte en vorm van u mielielanderya en aan ander aspekte 
van u meganisasiepatroon (b.v. in ploeg) te maak, om 
u stroper doeltreffend te laat werk? 
25b. lndien ja, wat was die belangrikste daarvan/sal die 
belangrikste daarvan wees? 
25c. Besluit beinvloed, ens? 
stroper te koop. 
ten gunste van/teen ~ 
26. As die oppervlakte van u plaas/mielielanderye in 
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aansienlike mate na 1968 verander het (A6, A7, bl 1 bo), 
het dit u besluit be1nvloed, ens? ..... ten gunste van/ 
teen ~ stroper te koop. 
27. Watter faktore bepefk die meganisasie van die mielie-
oesproses op u plaas, d.w.s. waarom koop/huur u nie 
meer en/of groter stropersnie? 
oppervlakte van plaas/mielielanderye ..... 
gebrek aan geld..... ander ..... 
28a. Het die taamlike gereelde toeneming van die mielieprys 
u besluit beinvloed, ens? ..... ten gunste van/teen~ 
stroper te koop. 
28b. 
28c. 
Is u tevrede met die toename 
Besluit beinvloed, ens? 
stroper te koop. 
wat plaasgevind het? 
ten gunste van/teen ~ 
29&. As u ~ stroper besit, het u ~ besonder goeie finansie~le 
jaar gehad toe u besluit het om ~ ~troper of nog ~ 
stroper te koop. 
29b. Besluit beinvloed, ens? 
stroper te koop. 
..... ten gunste van/teen~ 
30a. Weet u van 'n meer/ewe doeltreffende mielieoesmetode 
wat op u plaas sal pas (in vergelyking met ~ huidige 
metode)? 
30b. Indien ja, waarom gebruik u dit nie? 
30c. Indien ja, beteken dit dat u meer/minder/dieselfde 
getal/geen stropers sal moet he? 
30d. Indien ja, beteken dit dat u groter/kleiner/dieselfde 
grootte/geen stropers sal moet he? 
3la. Wanneer sal u 'n huidige stroper(s)/dorsmasjien(e) 
verkoop/skrap? ..... 
3lb. Waarom? 
3lc. Sal u dan ~ groter/kleiner/dieselfde grootte/geen 
stroper/dorsmasjien koop/huur? 
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3ld. Sal u dan meer/minder/dieselfde getal/geen stroper(s)/ 
dorsmasjien(e) koop/huur? 
32a. Is u tevrede met u huidige mielieoesmetode? 
32b. Is daar enige groot nadele? 
32c. Indien ja, watter is die belangrikste daarvan? 
33a. Wat was die drie belangrikste redes waarom u u huidige 





33b. Wat/wie was die belangrikste raadbronne/raadgewers wat 
u gehelp het om hierdie oesmetode te kies? 
33c. In u mening, is dit waar datsommige boere stropers koop 
om nie by die bure agter te bly nie? 
33d. Indien ja, sal u se dat hierdie praktyk algemeen is? 
34a. Sal u moontlik/waarskynlik ooit (weer) met die hand/ 
met ~ sleepstroper/ met ~ selfaangedrewe stroper 
mielies op u plaas oes? ..... 
34b. Indien ja, onder watter omstandighede sal u so maak? 
(antwoord): 
E. GEVOLGE VAN DIE MEGANISERING VAN DIE MIELIEOESPROSES 
Verrigting 
la. Het die meganisering van die mielieoesproses die 
produktiwiteit van arbeiders wat in oeswerk betrokke 
is verhoog? (d.w.s. die deel van die totale opbrengs 
wat deur elke arbeider opgelewer is) ..... 
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lb. Kan u min or meer skat hoeveel dit toegeneem het? ..... 
Indien ja, skatting: 
2a. Het die meganisering van die mielieoesproses die 
volgende vertig? 
(i) opbrengs/ha: ..... skatting 
(ii) wins op mielieproduksie: ..... skatting 
(iii) opbrengs op kapitaal bele: ..•.. skatting 
2b. Het u die tipe mielies beplant as gevolg van oes 
maganiesering verander? 
2c. Indien j a, het di t ( i) die opbrengs . . . . . ( ii) die 
kwaliteit van die finale produk ..... verbeter? ander 
belangrike besonderhede? 
Indiensneming 
Hoeveel van die afname/toename in die getal arbeiders 
en families in u diens het, volgens u skatting, as ~ 
direkte gevolg van maganiesering van die volgende 











(i) waar hierdie mense/families nou woon? 
Families 
(ii) watter soort werk hulle nou doen, of,of hulle 
werkloos is? 
Kredietvereistes/uitgawes 
4a. Het u middel-termyn kredietvereistes vir kapitaal-
toerusting as gevolg van die meganisering van die 
mielieoesproses aanmerklik toegeneem? ..... 
( skatting van toename: 
4b. Het u kort-termyn kredietvereistes vir brandstof, 
kunsmis, lone ens. as gevolg van die meganisering 
aansienlik toegeneem? ..... 
( skatting van toename: 
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Sa. Wat is nou die drie grootste uitgawes op u plaas (in 




( ••••• %) 
( ••••• %) 
( ••••• %) 




( ••••• %) 
( ••••• %) 
( ••••• %) 
Sc. As lone nie in albei Sa en Sb verskyn, weet u watter 
posisie hulle in albei gevalle geneem het? 
(Sa . . . . . . .... %; 
Sb . . . . . . .... %) 
Aller lei 
6a. Was die gebruik van stropers ~ belangrike rede waarom 
u enige veranderinge in u gewas of weiding 
patroon gemaak het? (Sien A7, bl. 1 bo) ..... 
Indien ja, belangrikste besonderhede: 
6b. Was die gebruik van stropers ~ belangrike oorsaak van 
enige veranderinge in u plaasoppervlakte? ..... 
Indien ja, belangrikste besonderhede: 
7a. Het die gebruik van stropers dit moontlik gemaak om 
grater beheer oor die hele oesproses te beoefen? 




- die weer: 
- ander (bes.): 
7c. Het u meer afhanklik van ander groepe/faktore geword? 
7d. Indien ja, op watter maniere? 





- ander (bes.) 
Meer afhanklik op: 
8a. Het die meganisering van die mielieoesproses u eie/ 
u arbeiders se lewenspatroon aanmerklik verander? 
8b. Indien ja, op watter wyse? 
Self Arbeiders 
- langer/korter vakansies 
- langer/korter werksdae/weke 
- minder onaangename werk 
- ander (bes.) 
8c. Kan u se of dit die lewenspatroon van die mense,wat 
u tevore as oesarbeiders indiensgeneem het,verbeter/ 
versleg het? ..... 
8d. Op watter wyse? 
9a. In u mening, wat is die drie belangrikste gevolge van 
die meganisering van die mielieoesproses op u plaas? 









Watter veranderinge in die mielieoesproses verwag u 
in die toekomende vyf jaar? 
Is u met die gevolge van die mielieoesproses op u 
plaas tevrede? 
Indien nee, watter aspekte is mees onbevredigend? 
Is u met die gevolge van die algemene meganiserings-
proses in die Suid Afrikaanse landbou tevrede? 
Indien nee, watter aspekte is mees onbevredigend? 
9g. As ons van die algernene landbourneganiseringsproses 
praat, in u rnening, wat is die drie belangrikste 





lOa. Baie plaasarbeiders het die landbou in die laa:»te 20 j aar 
verlaat. In u rnening,is dit goed/sleg vir boere; 
arbeiders? 
lOb. Kortliks, waarorn? 
lOc. Verwag u enige problerne/voordele, b.v. werkloosheid, 
politiese rnoeilikhede? 
lOd. In u rnening, is arrnoede/werkloosheid ~ ernstige 
probleern in 






lOe. Indien ja, behoort boere iets daaroor te doen? 
Watter soort rnaatreels behoort hulle te neern? 
lOf. Watter soort rnaatreels behoort die regering te neern? 
lOg. Watter soort rnaatreels behoort arbeiders self te neern? 
lla. Het u enige oprnerkings wat u wil rnaak/vrae wat u wil 
vra? 
llb. Dit is rnoontlik dat enkele belangrike vrae uit hierdie 
vraelys uitgelaat is. Indien wel, mag ek u weer 
nader? ..... 
BAlE DANKIE VIR U HULP! 
APPENDIX B 
TRANSKEI QUESTIONNAIRE 
(Note: This questionnaire was not duplicated and 
filled in - one copy per respondent - as in 
the case of Appendix A. For further details, 
see Section 2.2 above.) 
) 
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QUESTIONS FOR RECRUITERS (I.E. FOREMEN), SEASONAL WORKERS 
IN TRANSKEI 
1. Name: Residence: How long recruiting for? 
2. Seasonal Workers 
a. how many people wanting seasonal farm work? 
b. how many people finding seasonal farm work? 
c. how many teams? 
d. who are they? - sex? 
- age? 
- single women/men, families? 
- same people from year to year? 
e. where do they come from? 
f. have many people moved into these· areas from 'white' 
SA in recent years? 
g. have there been any changes in (a)-(f) in recent 
years? 
details? 
h. what has caused these changes? Satisfied? 
i. how are people contacted? (personal recruitment/ 
labour bureaux, etc.) 
3. Seasonal Work 
a. whom do they work for? - how are these farmers 
contacted? 
b. what sort(s) of work? 
c. in which areas? 
d. for how long do they work each year/week/day? 
e. how many employers are there? 
farmers with whom contracts are explicitly signed? 
others? 
f. do they have any other forms of work at other times 
of year? 
g. would they prefer to have other work, e.g. a full-
time job in a city? 
h. for how long have Transkei people been doing this work? 
i. have there been any changes in (a)-(h) in recent years? 
(details?) 
146 
j. what has caused these changes? Satisfied? 
k. if people are no longer able to find jobs in seasonal 
farm work, have they been able to find other work? 
(where, what sort, etc.?) 
4. Conditions of Employment 
a. how are they paid? 
b. how much are they paid? 
c. how are a team's earnings shared? 
d. how much maize/money do they bring home? 
e. what do they do with maize brought home? 
f. how are workers transported? 
g. how is maize transported? 
h. how much do they pay recruiter? 
i. what sorts of food/shelter/facilities do they have? 
j. do they have a contract with farmer/recruiter? 
(do they understand the contract? are contracts 
completed in full?) 
k. what rights do they have if, say, they feel the 
contract has been broken or they have been mistreated? 
1. what complaints do they have? 
m. how can they make complaints/requests? 
n. have there been any changes in (a)-(m) in recent 
years? (details?) 
o. what has caused these changes? 
5. Organization/General 
a. how are teams organized? 
who makes decisions? 
who cooks, washes? 
Satisfied? 
what happens if someone gets sick/hurt or wants to 
come home? 
Workmens' Compensation paid? 
does this happen often? 
b. is recruitment of this sort legal? 
c. how/where are they registered? 
d. have there been any changes in the law in recent 
years which have made it easier/more difficult to 
get seasonal farm work? 
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e. are there other similar recruitment schemes? 
where? (Transkei/Bophuthatswana/elsewhere?) 
whom to contact? 
how? 
do farmers/others come to labour bureaux? 
f. foreman/worker self age? 




METHOD OF ESTIMATION OF COSTS OF HARVESTING 
BY HAND, BY TRACTOR-DRAWN COMBINE AND BY 
SELF-PROPELLED COMBINE 
(See Figures 52-55) 
1. THE STUDY UNDERTAKEN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL 
ECONOMICS AND MARKETING 
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Empirical cost estimation in agriculture is seldom a straight-
forward exercise. It is not simply a matter of taking 
figures out of a well-kept ledger. Conditions vary so much 
between one farm and the next, let alone between regions, that 
costs cannot readily be compared. As van Wyk points out in 
connection with maize harvesting, '"n wesentlike probleem by 
'n ondersoek is die geweldige aantal veranderlike faktore 
wat hulle invloed op die ekonomie van die oe~proses .•• 
laat geld" (op .cit. (19 70) , pp. 3-4) . His list of examples, 
which is not exhaustive, includes no less than 20 such 
variables. 
The project - of which van Wyk was leader - undertaken in the 
late 1960s by the then Division of Agricultural Economic 
Research of the Department of Agricultural Economics and 
Marketing, to estimate the costs of the many alternative 
techniques of harvesting and delivering maize, was a remark-
ably pain&aking and thorough attempt to take the most important 
of these variables into account. An extract from van Wyk's 
description of the research method illustrates: 
"Die basiese gegewens .•• is by 'n monster 
mielieboere versamel terwyl die verskillende 
oesprosesse aan die gang was. By die versame-
ling ••• is gepoog om~ aantal herhalings van 
elke belangrike proses te verkry. Die inligting 
is ingesamel om die grootste moontlike reeks ver-
anderlikes te dek. Waar tye opgeneem is, is 
dit met behulp van stophoorlosies gedoen. Opper-
vlaktes en afstande is met maatlyne afgemeet en 
opbrengste is van akuraat bekende oppervlaktes 
bereken. Arbeidsure is bereken oor ~ lang periode 
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vir sowel spanne as individuele arbeiders. 
Standaardtye is vervolgens bereken deur 
regressielyne te pas op die resultate by 
verskillende opbrengspeile. • .• 'n 
vloeikaart (is) opgestel wat die ••• 
kombinasies van prosesse aangee waaruit 
die totale oes, dors en lewerings-
prosesse saamgestel is ••• Staandaard-
tye is bereken vir elke individuele proses 
volgens opbrengs per morg en ryspasiering 
Kosteberekenings (is) vir elke af-
sonderlike proses gedoen" (ibid, p.S). 
van Wyk goes on to define the costing procedure, the cost 
data sources and the assumptions made in connection with 
the chief cost variables, depreciation, interest charges, 
repairs, fuel and labour (ibid, pp.S, 6, 56). rhe over-
all procedure is widely accepted, though many variations 
are possible within it. Hunt (op.cit., pp.Sl-65) and 
Culpin (op.cit., p~.53-57) describe similar procedures. 
The conclusions of the Department•s study of most relevance 
here are that: 
yield per hectare (morgen) does not influence the unit 
cost of hand harvesting greatly, but reduces the unit 
cost of mechanical harvesting considerably 1 
hand harvesting in bulk (see section 3.1.1.1, p.41 
above) is much the cheapest method of hand harvesting, 
there is little difference between the cost of hand 
harvesting and of PTO combine harvesting, at low yields 
(i.e. about 1,5 tonnes per hectare and below), but that 
the superiority of PTO combine harvesting becomes clear 
as the yield increases, 
if the capacity of SP combines is fully utilized, the 
unit cost of harvesting is lower still than for PTO 
combines. (Ibid, pp.60-61) 
